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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the patronage refunds decision in the 
Farm Credit System (FCS) lending associations, and simulate the capital structure change of a 
representative association dynamically. Patronage refunds distribution is a unique feature of 
financial cooperative organization and has important impact on the capital structure of FCS 
association. First, I utilize a logit model to analyze the decision of paying patronage refunds 
versus not paying patronage refunds. Increased loan size, higher capital ratio and larger interest 
margin are found to significantly increase the probability of paying patronage refunds. The bank 
district in which an association belongs also matters. Second, I examine the decision of how 
much patronage refunds is distributed in panel tobit models. Capital ratio and interest margin are 
still significant factors. Moreover credit risk and profitability play important roles in determining 
the patronage refunds amount. Further, my estimations evidence the bank district diversity and 
the temporal persistency in patronage refunds. Finally, I employ the System Dynamics modeling 
techniques and conduct a simulation analysis on the changing capital structure according to the 
decisions of patronage refunds, new loans issued, and interest rate charged on loans. Risk 
uncertainty in interest rate and loan default are particularly discussed. My simulation outcome 
supports the FCS association‟s practice of building up capital reserves, yet warns the potential 
high volatility of loan interest rate when associations face risk shocks. For the first time, the 
research uses a panel data set that includes all FCS associations to conduct an empirical analysis. 
It offers new insights on what drives patronage refunds distribution and capital structure 
management in FCS associations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter summarizes the basics of the Farm Credit System and the characteristics of 
financial cooperative. Research motivation and research objectives are proposed. The data set 
utilized in this study is introduced and a research outline is tailored.  
1.1 Farm Credit System Basics 
The Farm Credit System (FCS) was established as a Government Sponsored Enterprise 
(GSE) by the U. S. Congress in the early 1900s in order to provide credit and services to the 
agricultural industry. The system is a set of 5 regional banks, 84 lending associations, a funding 
corporation, a mortgage corporation, and several service entities. FCS lending institutions 
include regional banks and affiliated lending associations. Both are organized as cooperatives. A 
unique feature of a cooperative is that the customers have to be the owners. For example, a 
farmer needs to purchase stock of a FCS association first and then applies for loans from the 
association. Therefore, the FCS association is owned and controlled by the people using its 
lending service.  
This cooperative form was originally chosen to serve local farmers exclusively, to 
support agricultural business growth defensively, and to provide long term agricultural loans and 
agricultural credit that are not offered elsewhere. Over more than a century, the organizational 
structure, the financial operating practices, and the regulation policies have been continuously 
changed, reformed, and developed.  
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FCS was established by the federal government to overcome market failures. FCS 
received emergency financing from the federal government during the Great Depression. It again 
obtained seed money from the government during the 1980s farm crisis. Although the money 
borrowed from the government has been paid off and FCS is privately owned by its members, 
the FCS still runs like a government-backed financial institution with a tax advantage to public 
investors. Therefore FCS can borrow at advantageous rates in the capital market. In return, FCS 
is obligated to provide lending service to agriculture, related businesses and homeowners in rural 
areas exclusively. 
FCS banks raise funds by selling securities in the primary market via the funding 
corporation. The banks lend money and provide supportive services to the associations. Then the 
associations lend the money to qualified agricultural borrowers.  So the banks act like financial 
intermediaries and provide wholesale funds to the associations. The associations act as retail 
lenders and issue loans directly to farmers. Farmers are the borrowers/members/owners of the 
associations and the associations are the borrowers/members/owners of the regional banks. A 
thorough explanation of FCS‟s organization and background is provided in the Chapter Two.  
The uniqueness of the cooperative structure, the government rooted enterprise status, and 
the obligation to provide credit to agriculture altogether complicate the capital management of 
FCS associations. Barry commented on capital management of FCS as the combination of the 
“profitability perspective of institutional ownership,” the “funding perspective of treasures,” and 
the “safety and soundness perspective of risk managers and regulators.” (Barry et al. 2000). He 
also concluded that “the broad scope of capital management introduces various costs, 
complexities, and challenges,” and “the underlying models can be conceptually rigorous and data 
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demanding.”1 Although the capital structure efficiency is viewed as contributing to a good 
financial performance, cooperatives are usually seen to have difficulties in reaching an optimal 
capital structure (Bonin et al. 1993). Cooperatives have vaguely defined property right structures 
which leads to conflicts over residual claims and decision control (Cook 1995).  
1.2 Motivation 
According to USDA data, total farm sector debt is $240.3 billion in 2010.
 2
 FCS holds 
approximately 43% of the real estate debt and 36% of the nonreal estate debt. Commercial banks 
hold 37% of the real estate debt and 51% of the nonreal estate debt. FCS and commercial banks 
together count for 84% of total agricultural debt.
 3
 There is no doubt that FCS plays important 
role in the agricultural lending market.  
As in any financial institution, the capital management is always an important issue that 
can largely affect financial performance and shareholder‟s benefits. However, as a financial 
cooperative FCS association has its own characteristics and standard finance theory generally 
does not apply to cooperative due to the following differences between a corporation and a 
cooperative.   
1.2.1 External Equity Financing 
Corporations typically have two external financing channels: debt financing and equity 
financing. For cooperatives, debt financing is the only external financing channel. They cannot 
issue stocks to nonmembers, or in other words, public investors. Therefore the only way for 
                                                 
1
 Barry (2001) “Modern Capital Management by Financial Institutions: Implications for Agricultural Lenders” AFR 
Vol 61, No. 2, 103-122 
2
 USDA, ERS: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/farmincome/wealth.htm 
3
 Farmdoc by ACE, UIUC: http://www.farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2011/05/the_financial_health_of_the_fa.html 
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cooperative to raise equity level is to increase the retained earnings, which is the internal 
financing channel.  
1.2.2 Capital Stock and Retained Earnings 
In order to borrow from FCS association, farmers are required to purchase a certain 
amount of FCS association‟s capital stocks to become members. The member of a FCS 
association is also the shareholder, the equity owner, the borrower, and the patron. Compared to 
capital stock, accumulated retained earnings constitute the majority of equity and belong to 
cooperative‟s members too. However, members have no right to sell capital stock to others and 
limited rights to claim retained earnings. The association decides on when and how the capital 
stock and retained earnings are redeemed.  
Since the equity capital is not tradable, it is held and will be redeemed at par value. It 
neither appreciates nor depreciates. Normally for corporations, the optimal capital structure 
occurs where the marginal rate of return on equity is equal to the marginal rate of interest on debt 
(VanSickle and Ladd, 1983). However it is impossible to observe the market value of equity and 
the shareholders are not able to measure the performance of a FCS association and its investment 
decision as the shareholders of a corporation. The absence of the market value of equity could 
cause the inefficiency of capital allocation.  
1.2.3 Operating Objective 
Commercial banks have simple and clear operating objective, that is, to maximize the 
return on equity. So corporation‟s shareholders care about two things: dividends and equity 
capital accumulation. Or equally, the return to their investment. FCS shareholders care less about 
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the return of the investment and more on the service, i.e., the availability and quantity of the 
loans that they want to borrow, and the interest rate they have to pay. In other words, the purpose 
of a cooperative is to provide services to its members at the lowest cost rather than generate a 
profit. Therefore the general theory to analyze for-profit business cannot be adapted on 
cooperatives.  
1.2.4 Shareholder’s Return 
With such an operating objective, cooperative is supposed to benefit the members either 
by sharing net income or offering favorable price. The income returned is called a patronage 
refund. As for FCS association, favorable price means low interest rate charged on loans. Some 
associations pay cash patronage refunds. Some offer low interest rates on loans. Patronage 
refund is not another name for dividend in cooperatives. Cooperative returns part of its net 
income to the shareholders in proportion to the patronage, i.e., the member‟s usage rather than 
member‟s capital contribution.  
More cash patronage or low interest rate both reduces the equity capital. A good capital 
reserve is important for the stability and growth of FCS associations. On the contrary, low or no 
cash patronage refunds build up more equity and the association can invest more aggressively. 
However, it may hurt the relationship with members and reduce the demand for loans. 
Association‟s decision on whether or not distribute patronage refunds, and how much to 
distribute is complex and affects the capital structure of the association. Associations usually 
keep their capital structure high above the regulatory minimum. A too high capital structure 
means the association may lose the return it could earn if the capital was invested. A too low 
capital structure may put the association into a vulnerable position with unbearable risk.  
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Overall the owner-and-patron driven characteristics of cooperatives makes it difficult for 
FCS associations to find a best way to simultaneously keep a sufficient capital level for 
unexpected risk and steady growth, keep offering agricultural loans at competitive rates, and 
keep a reasonable level of returns of profit for members. General finance theory and concepts 
need to be applied with caution since the operating objective, the equity financing channel, the 
way to share profit with shareholders are different between a cooperative and a corporation.  
Different earnings distributions, different capital management goals, and different risk 
exposures can jointly affect the association‟s lending decisions, financial performance, and 
members‟ benefits. Balancing patronage refunds with retained earnings, quantifying the effects 
associated with earnings allocation, and determining a reasonable capital structure based on 
projected assets, earnings, financial conditions, and possible loan losses are interdependent and 
critical for the members, the management, and the regulator. 
1.3 Research Objective 
There is a group of studies in agricultural economics that focus on cooperative business 
and cooperative finance since the 1970s. Topics broadly cross recognizing the cost of equity 
capital, evaluating the effects of changing the cooperative‟s capital structure, surveying and 
simulating equity allocation and redemption plans, and comparing the performance and growth 
of cooperatives under different capital policy scenarios (Dahl and Dobson, 1976; VanSickle and 
Ladd, 1983; Garoyan 1983; Caves and Petersen, 1986; Royer, 1993; Fulton et al., 1995; Cook, 
1995; Parcell et al., 1998; Chaddad et al., 2005; Royer and Smith, 2007). Royer summarized that 
the important problems of cooperative finance and taxation are “developing an optimal financial 
structure, determining the best combination of cash and noncash patronage refunds to distribute, 
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and evaluating alternative plans for acquiring and redeeming equity.” (Royer 2004, page 138). 
He also pointed out that “much of the recent analysis of alternative cooperative organizational 
forms is based on weak theoretical foundations and limited empirical evidence” (page 139). 
My dissertation is based on previous agricultural cooperative studies and extends the 
research to the area of financial cooperative. I examine the capital structure of FCS‟s lending 
associations with a focus on the patronage refunds distributed. A dynamic simulation model is 
developed with empirical validation from a nationwide panel data set. The goal of this research is 
to observe the pattern of patronage refunds, analyze the determinants of whether or not to 
distribute patronage refunds, identify the factors affecting how much patronage refunds are 
distributed, and to simulate the capital structure evolvement with the financial decisions FCS 
association needs to make and the important factors identified empirically.  
The simulation model is designed to capture the interactions between patronage refunds, 
retained earnings, new loans‟ growth, interest rate charged on loans, and other capital structure 
inflows and outflows dynamically. The relationships between a cooperative‟s growth, interest 
rate, risk expectation, regulatory capital requirement, and returns to members are considered 
simultaneously. The model is also designed to evaluate the impacts and tradeoffs of alternative 
capital structure management strategies of FCS associations. 
This research contributes to the cooperative economics literatures: first, it utilizes a large 
panel dataset that includes all of the FCS associations nationwide and over a 10 year horizon. 
Therefore systematic patterns can be identified, and empirical tests can be conducted. Second, it 
targets the capital structure issues of financial cooperatives that have not been fully discussed. 
Unlike the production or supply cooperatives, FCS financial cooperatives operate in a 
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nationwide system and under restricted capital regulation. Third and perhaps most importantly, 
the FCS is currently undergoing a risk-adjusted capital structure reform, and research discussing 
capital position and efficiency issues can contribute to better reform policies.  
FCS now has fewer numbers and types of institutions because of continuous 
consolidations and mergers. Risk-adjusted methods are adopted in calculating the allowance for 
loan loss in order to address the optimal capital level since 2004. Efficient patronage refunds and 
net earnings distribution are attracting a lot of attention since the associations currently keep a 
high level of capital reserves. Associations get more involved in the purchase and sale of 
participation from each other in order to diversify risk and maintain target capital structures. In 
short, capital structure management focusing on profitability, efficiency, stable growth, risk 
reduction, and patron‟s rewarding has become an important subject in the sense of improving 
credit delivery, related services and market share presence of the FCS associations.  
1.4 Data Explanation 
Quarterly Call Report data from 2000 to 2009 are used in this research. Call Report is 
referred as the Quarterly Report of Condition and Income. In the United States, all regulated 
financial institutions are required to file this kind of report no later than 30 days after the end of 
each quarter. The Farm Credit Administration maintains the call reports of all FCS institutions, 
including both associations and banks.
4
 For each quarter and for each institution, around 20 
financial tables are reported, such as balance sheet, income statement, reconcilement of net 
worth, change of net worth, and etc.  
                                                 
4
 http://www.fca.gov/exam/data_download.html 
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Three major tables used most frequently in my dissertation are listed in Table 1.1, Table 
1.2 and Table 1.3 for the demonstration purpose. Agstar financial service, an agricultural credit 
association, is selected as an example. From the balance sheet of AgStar in Table 1.1, we can tell 
that the majority of assets are composed of loans only. Nonaccrual loans represents the non-
performing loans which interest is overdue for more than 90 days. Liability mainly is the debt 
borrowed from FCS bank and interest payables.  
Besides the debt capital, FCS association‟s equity capital contains two parts: capital stock 
and earned surplus. A borrower is required to pay $1000 or 2% of the loan amount, whichever is 
less, to become a FCS stockholder in order to acquire the loan. This initial amount constitutes the 
capital stock. Compared to earned surplus, capital stock is small and does not vary largely over 
time. Earned surplus is the accumulated retained earnings and it is the majority of equity capital. 
In the income statement in Table 1.2, the Income before tax and adjustment equals Net 
interest income, plus Net noninterest income, plus Net gain or loss, then minus Provision for loan 
loss. After paying Income taxes, the Net income is subjected to the allocation of patronage 
refunds. And the distribution of net income is recorded in Table 1.3. The Net income from the 
income table is added to the beginning balance of the Unallocated Surplus in Earned Surplus. 
Then it is allocated between Dividends, Patronage distribution, and Retirements. In this example, 
the net income 18,540 goes to the unallocated account. 10,019 from the unallocated surplus is 
transferred to the allocated surplus for redemption. Retirement records the paying out account. 
11,276 of patronage refunds are redeemed as well as the 310 capital stock. Agstar also issues 449 
new capital stocks in this quarter. 
10 
 
The capital structure plotted in Figure 1.1 helps understand the changes of equity capital. 
FCS association does not take deposits, so it borrows its debt capital (Liabilities) from FCS bank. 
The majority of association‟s assets are agricultural loans (Assets). The cooperative form 
excludes external equity financing in order to keep the ownership of the cooperative in the hands 
of the active agricultural borrowers. Equity comes from the purchasing of capital stock by 
members (Capital Stock) and primarily from the retained earnings (Earned Surplus). Retained 
earnings are kept in an allocated account and in an unallocated account. The unallocated retained 
earnings (URE) compose the major part of equity capital and are the most stable form of capital. 
URE belongs to the members but association has no plan, practice or expectation of the equity 
redemption at current point. On the other hand, the allocated surplus (AS) account is connected 
to each member and will be redeemed gradually. Patron‟s equity is redeemed in a revolving fund 
method. That is to say, every year association retains a proportion of net earnings, adds to the 
revolving account, and retires it eventually in the order of first-in/first-out. The retired proportion 
of earned surplus is distributed as cash patronage refunds. 
1.5 Research Outline 
In order to elaborate a dynamic model on the simulation of the FCS association‟s capital 
structure, the following three research steps are designed. First, I utilize the 10 years of call 
reports of all FCS associations and conduct data analysis on the decision of patronage refunds of 
FCS associations. Therefore a logistic model is fitted first to identify the factors that influence 
the decision on whether or not to have patronage refunds. The time series pattern and regional 
pattern of patronage refund payments are examined. The characteristics of those who choose to 
make patronage refunds are compared with those who do not. A logistic model is estimated to 
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identify the determinants of a cooperative‟s patronage refund decision. The explanatory variables 
used in the model include capital adequacy, size, profitability, retained unallocated earnings, 
credit risk, interest rate, and tax. The method of Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) is 
applied to adjust for the autoregressive observations on the same association over time.  
Second, with the results of the logistic analysis, the patronage refund payers are 
emphasized and further investigation is conducted on the decision of how much is actually paid 
out. Two Tobit models are used to handle the censored dependent variable, patronage refunds. 
The first model is a random effect Tobit to capture the heterogeneity across bank regions. The 
second Tobit contains a lagged dependent variable to adjust the persistence of the patronage 
refund decision. In the second Tobit, a Generalized Moment Method (GMM) is applied to 
identify the serial correlation on the error term, and first differencing is conducted to eliminate 
the association level effects in order to obtain the valid moment. 
Finally, relationships among interest income, interest expense, patronage refunds, risk 
shocks, lending decision, and other financial factors are simulated in a dynamic model. System 
Dynamics methodology and STELLA software are used to frame, understand and simulate the 
capital structure as an interactive and evolving system.   
Separate essay chapters are tailored correspondingly to the above three steps: statistical 
estimation on patronage refunds paying decisions, on patronage refunds amounts, and simulation 
model on capital structure simulations. Chapter One contains the introduction, including the 
problem statement, motivation and research design. A brief literature review is addressed, while 
detailed reviews of relevant studies are provided in each chapter. Chapter Two serves as a 
background explanation. It introduces the FCS organization, history, components, capital 
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structure, operation practice, and current financial condition. Chapter Three focuses on the yes-
or-no decision of patronage refunds of FCS associations. Chapter Four concerns the how-much-
is-paid decision of patronage refunds. Chapter Five develops a dynamic model of the capital 
structure.  
1.6 Brief Literature Review 
This section gives a brief literature review on the FCS and on the capital issues of 
agricultural cooperatives. There are several studies on FCS. Lins and Barry discussed the 
government agency status of FCS and pointed out the economic impact of removing the agency 
status (Lins and Barry, 1984). Lee and Irwin introduced FCS basics, history, and regulation 
policies. They summarized FCS restructuring since 1985 and provided preliminary evaluations 
(Lee and Irwin, 1996). Barry et al. developed a simulation model for the Farm Credit System 
Insurance Corporation to evaluate the long-term adequacy of the insurance fund (Barry, Sherrick, 
Lins, Banner, Dixon and Brake, 1996). Their model explicitly accounted for credit risk, interest 
rate risk, and liquidity risk through probability distributions, accounting specifications and 
estimated relationships. Jensen examined the impact of FCS‟s government agency status on 
agricultural credit efficiency with a demand supply model and showed evidence of deadweight 
loss and market distortion (Jensen 2000). Featherstone et al. assesses the probability of default 
and the credit risk rating of loans using FCS loan data (Featherstone et al., 2006). 
There are more studies on agricultural production or supply cooperatives. Royer gave a 
nice summary on the finance of cooperatives in the book ‘Cooperatives and Local 
Development’(Royer, 2004). The relevant studies focused on cost of equity, optimal debt equity 
ratio, and the comparison of various financial specifications. Dahl and Dobson (1976) used a 
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recursive linear model to simulate financial structures of Wisconsin farm cooperatives. Beierlein 
and Schrader (1978) analyzed the effects of changing capital structures of farm cooperatives on 
member patrons. They demonstrated that under certain conditions, policies that are commonly 
considered favorable to patrons could actually hurt the patrons in long run. VanSickle and Ladd 
(1983) developed a model to maximize the after-tax profits of member patrons and derived 
results for a cooperative under various hypothesized scenarios of capital policies. Royer and 
Cobia (1984) modeled the retirement of equity and different pattern of patronage refunds.  
Royer and Shihipar (1997) employed the patron age distribution estimated from data and 
predicted which equity retirement would dominate given certain cooperative characteristics. 
Barton, Parcell and Featherstone (2001) incorporated stochastic interest rates to estimate the 
optimal equity assets ratio for agricultural cooperatives. Diaz-Hermelo, Gray and Smith (2001) 
analyzed the capital management strategies for farmer-owned cooperatives. The results 
suggested that decreasing cash patronage to increase stock redemptions is a poor strategy. 
Results also indicated that using a base capital plan can improve the control of the balance sheet, 
improve profitability, reduce the variability in cash flows for the cooperative and its members, 
and improve the use-to-ownership balance.  
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Tables 
Table 1.1: Balance Sheet of AgStar Financial Services, ACA (6/30/2008 $ in thousands)  
Cash 0 Interest bearing liabilities 4,153,64
7 
Marketable investments 615,653 Accrued interest payable 40,465 
Accounts receivable 19,279 Accounts payable 29,631 
Accrual loans 3,905,37
4 
Other liabilities 81,204 
Nonaccrual loans 44,462     
Allowance for loan loss 13,008 Total Liabilities 4,275,31
6 
Other loan items 50,934     
Net loans 3,987,76
2 
Capital stock 12,485 
Accrued interest receivable 50,694 Earned surplus 591,119 
Equity investments in other FCS 
institutions  
129,780     
Other assets 75,752 Total Net Worth 603,604 
Total Assets 4,878,92
0 
Total Liabilities and Net 
worth 
4,878,92
0 
 
 
17 
 
Table 1.2: Income Statement of AgStar Financial Services, ACA (6/30/2008 $ in thousands)  
Interest income 70,597 
Interest expense 40,479 
Net interest income 30,118 
Provision for loan loss 2,551 
Net gain or loss  -271 
Noninterest income 15,243 
Noninterest expense 21,474 
Net noninterest income -6,231 
Income before tax and adjustment 21,065 
Income taxes 2,525 
Net income 18,540 
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Table 1.3: Changes in Net Worth of AgStar Financial Services, ACA (6/30/2008 $ in thousands)  
  
  
Capital Stock 
Earned Surplus 
Net Worth 
Allocated Surplus Unallocated Surplus 
Beginning balance 12,346 193,558 390,297 596,201 
Net income 0 0 18,540 18,540 
Dividends 0 0 0 0 
Patronage distribution 0 10,019 -10,019 0 
Retirements -310 -11,276 0 -11,586 
Issuance 449 0 0 449 
Ending balance 12,485 192,301 398,818 603,604 
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Figures 
Figure 1.1: FCS Association‟s Capital Structure 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY, COMPOSITION AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS  
OF FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
2.1 Overview of FCS 
The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) is the independent and regulatory agency for the 
Farm Credit System (FCS). FCA charters, regulates, and examines the banks, associations, and 
related entities of FCS. The U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture oversee FCA and FCS.   
FCS is federally chartered and privately owned by the member borrowers. It provides 
credit and related services to agricultural producers, farm businesses, farmer-owned cooperatives, 
rural homeowners, and firms engaged in international agricultural trade. FCS was the first 
Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) established in the United States and the only one that 
does direct lending.  
FCS institutions, unlike commercial banks or thrifts, do not take deposits. Loans are not 
funded by deposits but rather through the sale of FCS securities in the national and international 
capital markets. The Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation (FFCBFC) is in charge of 
the marketing of system-wide securities in the primary market. The Government Sponsored 
Enterprise (GSE) status permits the FCS to sell securities at rates just slightly above the U.S. 
Treasury. The size of the FCS, its collective liability for its debt, and its historical ties to the 
government result in an "implied guarantee" on its securities if the assets of the Farm Credit 
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System Insurance Corporation were to be exhausted. Another exclusive benefit for FCS is that 
all income from agricultural real estate loans is tax-exempt. The Federal Agricultural Mortgage 
Corporation (Farmer Mac) provides a secondary market for agricultural real estate, government 
guaranteed portions of certain loans, and rural housing mortgages in order to satisfy the liquidity 
requirement of the investors.  
In exchange for these benefits, the FCS lending institutions are required to exclusively 
serve rural and agricultural credit markets. The rationale for this bargain is to ensure that credit is 
available to rural markets that might be abandoned by other commercial lenders. For example, 
real estate loans with high risk and long maturity are in general charged with a high interest rate 
and restricted terms by commercial banks. Although the FCS is now providing a wide range of 
financial services to its customer base, slightly more than 50% of its business still comes from 
agricultural real estate lending.
5
  
2.2 Composition of FCS Institutions 
The two major components of FCS institutions are the region banks and the local lending 
associations. Figure 2.1 summarizes the organizational structure of FCS. 
On the banks side, there are 4 Farm Credit Banks (FCB) and only 1 Agricultural Credit 
Bank (ACB). Four FCBs are Agribank, AgFirst, U.S. AgBank, and Farm Credit Bank of Texas. 
FCS banks provide funds to their subsidiary associations and the associations issue loans to the 
borrowers in their territories. CoBank is the only ACB and has a nationwide charter. As an ACB, 
CoBank not only provides funds to its 4 affiliated associations, it also provides lending and other 
financial services directly to large agribusiness and agricultural cooperatives. CoBank is 
                                                 
5
 Quoted from FCA 2008 annual report. 
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authorized to finance U.S. agricultural exports and provide international banking services for all 
kinds of agricultural, aquatic, rural and public utility cooperatives. Territory districts of the five 
FCS banks are shown in Figure 2.2. 
On the association side, there are 3 Farm Land Credit Association (FLCA) and 81 
Agricultural Credit Association (ACA). FLCA only makes long-term mortgage loans, and the 
earnings made by FLCA are federal tax exempt and state tax exempt. ACA has a parent-
subsidiary structure, which means ACA as a parent owns a Production Credit Association (PCA) 
subsidiary and a Federal Land Credit Association (FLCA) subsidiary. The subsidiary PCA 
makes short-, intermediate-term loans and the subsidiary FLCA makes long-term loans. 
Therefore ACA can make short-, intermediate-, and long-term loans.  
In the early 1980s, the FCS had 37 banks (12 land banks, 12 intermediate credit banks 
and 13 banks for cooperatives) and more than 1,000 associations. In 2011, only 5 banks and 84 
associations remained. The trend of mergers and consolidation is showed in Figure 2.3. Since 
2003, the structure of FCS has been relatively stable, and the number of institutions has reduced 
gradually. 
Beside the banks and associations, there are three other important service entities in FCS: 
FFCBFC, FCSIC and Farmer Mac (See Figure 2.1). The Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding 
Corporation (FFCBFC) raises loan funds by issuing and marketing a variety of system-wide 
consolidated securities with a broad range of maturities and structures. This is how FCS 
institutions obtain the majority of their loan funds. These securities are offered by the Funding 
Corporation through a nationwide group of securities dealers and dealer banks.  
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The Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC) is a federal government-
controlled corporation. Its main function is to insure the timely payment of principal and interest 
on the notes, bonds, and other obligations issued by FCS. The FCSIC collects annual insurance 
premiums from FCS banks just like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Each 
association is required to save a certain amount of restricted capital with their district banks to 
satisfy the guaranteed repayment function. FCSIC also ensures the retirement of eligible 
borrowers stock at par value and facilitates FCS mergers and consolidations. 
The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) is a Government-
sponsored enterprise that provides a secondary market for agricultural real estate and rural 
housing mortgage loans. Farmer Mac provides greater liquidity and lending capacity to FCS 
agricultural lenders. Farmer Mac has different programs on conventional loans and loans 
guaranteed by USDA. 
2.3 History of FCS 
Since the establishment of FCS, the organizational structure and the components of FCS 
have changed greatly. Back to the early 20th century, agricultural real estate loans from 
commercial banks were rarely available and had prohibitively high rates and short terms. In 
order to provide credit to farmers, the FCS was chartered and initially capitalized by the federal 
government‟s $125 million seed money with the Federal Farm Loan Act in 1916. The 1916 act 
created twelve Federal Land Banks in twelve geographical districts to provide long-term loans. 
There were hundreds of Farm Loan Associations that were run as lending agents for the twelve 
banks. Creation of the FCS coincided with a favorable time for American farmers because of the 
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demand for food in Europe during World War I. However, prices collapsed after the war and 
farmers faced severe shortage of the short-term loans. 
 The 1923 Agricultural Credits Act added another twelve Federal Intermediate Credit 
Banks to the twelve districts to make operating loans. But the efforts were flawed by geographic 
difficulties and complicated loan approval procedures. When the Great Depression started, the 
banks‟ abilities to finance agriculture were almost powered down. The federal government had to 
use $189 million in federal funds to recapitalize the Federal Land Banks under the Emergency 
Farm Mortgage Act in 1933.  
The 1933 Farm Credit Act renovated the Intermediate Credit Banks, established twelve 
Production Credit Associations as the lending agents for the Intermediate Banks, and established 
another new thirteen Banks for Cooperatives (BCs) for the purpose of making short-term loans. 
The administrator Farm Credit Administration (FCA) was formulated and took over the 
supervision of the FCS.  
Under such structure, each bank had a geographic district and each association within a 
district had its own territory to serve. Each district had a similar organizational structure, and 
there was no competition among districts.
 
The segmentation of loans into real estate and 
production loans even precluded competition between agencies within the same district. Post 
World War II brought prosperity to American agriculture. In 1968, the FCS repaid all the federal 
government supportive capital and became completely capitalized by retained earnings and 
capital stock held by the members.  
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The 1971 Farm Credit Act, with the 1980 amendments, spread the range of services to 
rural home mortgages, leasing services, international and rural utility lending, and YBS (Young, 
Beginning and Small) farmers. The organizational structure changed substantially after the 
agricultural depression in the 1980s. Falling land values, rising inflation, and an increasing 
amount of nonaccrual loans quickly drained off the capital of the FCS associations, and Congress 
had to step in again. The Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation (FAC) was 
created to provide $4 billion assistance to FCS institutions that experienced financial difficulty. 
A fully repayable, privately financed line of credit was provided by issuing 5 types of bonds with 
15 years maturity guaranteed by the government. 
The 1987 Agricultural Credit Act intended to improve the FCS to be more efficient, safer, 
more competitive and responsive to market changes. Risk-based capital standards were 
mandated. The Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC) was created, financed by 
annual contributions (restricted capital) from FCS banks, to ensure the timely payment of 
principal and interest on securities and other obligations issued by FCS banks. The Federal Farm 
Credit Banks Funding Corporation (FFCBFC) was created to oversee the sales of FCS securities. 
The 1987 act also created the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) to 
establish a secondary mortgage market to add liquidity. Thus the basic structure of the modern 
FCS was formatted.  
The farm crisis and the 1987 Act stimulated the consolidation of FCS institutions. Since 
then FCS institutions could compete with each other for financial services. Federal Intermediate 
Credit Bank and Federal Land Bank in the same district were consolidated. Federal Land Bank‟s 
associations could choose to either merge with the Production Credit Association (PCA) for a 
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new Agricultural Credit Association (ACA), or opt to become stand-alone Federal Land Credit 
Associations (FLCA) for making real estate loans. Banks for Cooperatives merged as well.  
Beginning in the 1990s, the agricultural producers began their recovery from the 
recession. FCS‟s financial health recovery continued and strengthened into the 2000s. The Farm 
Assistance Corporation (FAC) stopped issuing bonds in 1992. All government financial 
assistance was repaid with interest by 2005. Therefore the FAC‟s job was done and its charter 
was canceled in 2006. The FCS‟s market share of the agricultural debt market has been 
increasing and accounted for about a third of the total in 2009. The capital levels of the FCS 
associations were built up gradually and more retained earnings were kept as unallocated equity 
capital.  
2.4 Financial Market and Conditions of FCS 
2.4.1 Market Competitors 
Based on USDA statistics, the U.S. total farm business debt was $240.3 billion in 2010, 
and the expected value for 2011 is $241.6 billion. Real estate debt accounted for about 55% of 
the total farm debt. The farm equity is expected to rise from $1.88 trillion in 2010 to $2.01 
trillion in 2011. The debt-to-equity ratio is expected to decline from 12.8% in 2010 to 12% in 
2011, which indicates a good solvency position. Figure 2.4 shows the USDA statistics on U.S. 
farm business debt. We can see that the majority of the loan volume is held by commercial banks 
and FCS. FCS‟s market share was 36.7% in 2007, second to commercial banks‟ 45.4%. Both 
FCS and commercial banks altogether represent more than 80% of the total farm business debt 
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market. The market share chart in Figure 2.4 clearly indicates the steady growth in both FCS and 
Commercial Banks relative to other farm credit providers after 2000. 
Except for FCS and commercial banks, other major agricultural lenders in the United 
States include individuals and others such as seller‟s financing and trade firms; life insurance 
companies; and the USDA Farm Service Agency. The agricultural credit providers differ in 
organizational structure, operating practice, degrees of specialization, and sources of funds 
(Barry, 2000). The most important competitors, commercial banks, are discussed here.   
Commercial banks generally obtain funds from deposits and primarily finance operations 
in livestock and poultry production, as well as large agribusinesses and international trade. An 
evolutionary feature is that nonagricultural commercial banks (with farm loans less than 10% of 
total assets) have become the major lenders in volume, while agricultural commercial banks 
primarily serve rural, local areas. Commercial banks are also important buyers of securities sold 
by the FCS. Commercial banks dominate non-real estate farm loans while FCS lending 
associations dominate the real estate farm loans.  
2.4.2 FCS Financial Conditions 
The major indicators such as earnings, asset quality and capital level in the past five year 
(Table 2.1) show that the FCS financial condition in general is sound and safe. However, the 
national recession has begun to reduce the demand for farm products and increase input prices. It 
hurts the profitability of farmers and their repayment capacity. Being increasingly spread 
between treasuries and the FCS‟s long term debt issuances also limits FCS‟s ability to raise 
capital. Although FCS institutions can still keep their capital ratios well above the minimum 
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regulatory requirements, the economic downturn, financial market weaknesses, the reduced 
margin of many agricultural producers, and potential government actions all lead to declines of 
the FCS‟s financial indicators in recent years. 
FCS earned $2.85 billion in 2009 compared with $2.92 billion in 2008. The 2.4% decline 
is due to the increased amount of provisions for loan loss. FCS‟s provision for loan loss has 
increased from $408 million in 2008 to $925 million in 2009. Asset quality has deteriorated. The 
ratio of nonperforming loans over gross loans keeps increasing from 0.43% in 2007 and 1.5% in 
2008 to 2.14% in 2009. In order to deal with the riskier lending situation, FCS established more 
loan loss provision of $408 million in 2008, compared to $81 million in 2007. The allowance for 
loan loss has increased from 0.58% of the outstanding loans in 2008 to 0.82%. Net charge-offs, 
which are the losses absorbed by FCS capital, have increased from $99 million in 2008 to $518 
million in 2009. Besides the existing loans, demand for new loans has lowered. The total loan 
growth rate was only 2.1% compared to 13% in 2008. 
It is obvious that FCS is affected by credit deterioration and an overall weak economy. 
One reaction taken by FCS is to pay out a smaller percentage of net income as patronage refunds. 
FCS declared a total of $958 million in patronage refunds, which equals 33% of the net income. 
In 2009 only 26% of net income was returned as patronage refunds.  
Although the market is in a downturn, the capital level of FCS is still maintained at a 
solid level. Capital increased from $27.1 billion in 2008 to $29.9 billion in 2009. The increase 
mainly came from a more favorable net interest margin, higher retained earnings, growth in 
restricted capital, and additional paid-in capital.  
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The capital/assets ratio increased from 12.7% in 2008 to 13.9% in 2009. The high capital 
buffer kept by most FCS institutions helps even out some negative influence from the economic 
recession. The capital position and profitability level do not change dramatically. Figure 2.5 
shows that the overall FCS financial conditions are stable in the sense of ROA and ROE levels. 
The 2004 spike was mainly caused by adjusting the allowance for loan loss in the accounting 
book rules. The net income has lowered since 2008 and earnings management seems to play an 
important role on keeping the return ratios stable.  
2.5 Relationship between FCS Banks and Associations 
Broadly speaking, the capital structure of a firm is the ratio of debt to equity or equity to 
assets. FCS associations do not take deposits. The majority of the debt of an association is the 
interest bearing liabilities such as notes payable to the FCS banks or other FCS institutions. The 
equity is composed of capital stock, earned surplus, and accumulated other comprehensive 
income. The associations‟ assets are mainly the loans, notes, sales contracts and leases, plus the 
accrued interest receivable, equity invested in other FCS institutions, and other assets.  
FCS banks borrow from the capital market and provide funds for associations‟ lending 
activities. Banks sell securities continuously to refund maturing bonds and obtain new funds for 
loan growth. Associations borrow the raised funds from the banks and lend them to farmers 
through the funding channel (Figure 2.6). Associations charge loan interest on farmer borrowers 
and also need to pay interest to the banks for borrowed funds. The difference between these two 
interest rates is the interest margin, and the earned interest is the most important proportion of 
the net income of FCS associations.  
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As mentioned before, farmer borrowers need to purchase participant certificates to 
acquire loans. This composes the capital stock part of the equity. Associations can choose to 
issue new preferred capital stocks in the operation. In return borrowers receive dividends as 
stockholders of the associations. This is done via the investing channel in Figure 2.6.  
However, capital stock and dividends are less important if compared to retained earnings 
and patronage refunds. Since external equity financing is not an option, FCS associations 
extensively use retained earnings as an internal equity financing channel. The accumulated 
retained earnings are retired in the revolving account as patronage refunds. Patronage refunds are 
considered the most typical method to share profit with FCS members. Associations are also 
member and owner of the banks therefore receive patronage income just like the member 
borrowers receive patronage refunds from the associations. This constructs the service channel in 
Figure 2.6. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1: FCS Major Financial Indicators Annual Comparison (dollars in thousands) 
 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Gross loan volume 164,830,000 161,423,000 142,906,000 123,436,000 106,272,000 
Nonperforming loans 3,535,000 2,416,000 621,000 615,000 600,000 
Nonaccrual loans 3,369,000 2,282,000 512,000 533,000 524,000 
Non-perform loans/gross loans 2.14% 1.50% 0.43% 0.50% 0.56% 
Bonds and notes 178,358,000 179,769,000 155,295,000 134,466,000 113,576,000 
Capital/assets 13.90% 12.70% 14.20% 15.00% 16.30% 
Surplus/assets 11.57% 10.80% 11.52% 12.25% 13.30% 
Net income  2,850,000 2,916,000 2,703,000 2,379,000 2,096,000 
Return on assets 1.33% 1.44% 1.56% 1.59% 1.61% 
Return on equity 9.92% 10.63% 10.44% 10.06% 9.43% 
Net interest margin 2.65% 2.41% 2.43% 2.48% 2.58% 
Source: FCS 2009 Call Reports and the FCS Annual Information Statement provided by the FFCBFC.  
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Figures 
Figure 2.1: Organizational Structure of FCS in Year 2011 
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Figure 2.2: FCS Territory Districts in Year 2011 
 
Source: FCA webpage http://www.fca.gov/info/directory.html 
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Figure 2.3:  Number of FCS Associations, 2000-2009 
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Figure 2.4: Market Shares of U.S. Farm Business Debt, 1989-2008 
 
Sources: FCA 2009 annual report. 
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Figure 2.5: FCS Net Income, ROA and ROE Yearly Comparison (dollars in millions) 
 
Note: Net income for 2004 includes $1.167 billion in net reversals of the allowance for loan losses.  
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Figure 2.6: Structure and Funding Channels of FCS Institutions 
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CHAPTER 3 
PATRONAGE REFUNDS PAYING DECISION OF FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
ASSOCIATIONS: A LOGIT MODEL WITH CORRELATED DATA 
3.1 Introduction 
As a financial institution, Farm Credit System (FCS) lending association is established 
and operated to provide agricultural loans to farmers. As a cooperative enterprise, FCS‟s lending 
association is constituted to return part or all profit to members, and the primary means is by 
distributing the patronage refunds. The patronage refunds make the cooperatives distinctive from 
other business forms. In 2008 FCS declared $958 million in patronage refunds, which equals to 
33% of the net income. In 2009 FCS declared $749 million in patronage refunds, which equals to 
26% of the net income.
6
 
For FCS lending associations, paying patronage refunds can help entice members to do 
business with the cooperative, can reduce members‟ borrowing cost, and can also benefit the 
cooperative with tax exemptions
7
. On the other hand, paying patronage refunds, especially in 
cash, can lower the capital reserves that support the financial safety and potential growth of the 
cooperative. In recent years, the retained earnings have become the major source of equity 
capital in FCS associations. Since FCS associations face such tradeoffs between maintaining 
sufficient capital sources and providing reasonable returns to members, understanding how the 
cooperatives approach this decision is an interesting and important question from both a 
regulation and efficiency perspective. 
                                                 
6
 Data are extracted from the 2008 and 2009 Farm Credit Administration Annual Reports.  
7
 When a cooperative pays patronage refunds, it can deduct them from its taxable income. When patrons receive 
patronage refunds, they must take them into account for tax purposes. In general, „single tax‟ principle is applied.  
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Paying patronage refunds is a unique feature of the capital structure management in the 
financial cooperatives. It is comparable to the dividend payments in the corporations in the sense 
of sharing profit with the shareholders. However, dividend and patronage are obvious two 
different things. Dividend is paid based on the number of outstanding shares, i.e., the amount of 
capital stock. Patronage refunds are returned based on the contribution to the association‟s net 
income that was made by the members. In cooperatives, benefits are distributed according to the 
usage rather than the amount of investment.  
There is considerable amount of research on the dividend policy in finance journals in the 
past ten years (Fama and French , Grullon et al. 2002, Dickens et al. 2002, Julio and Ikenberry 
2004, DeAngelo et al. 2006, Haggard and Howe 2008), but the patronage refunds distribution in 
the financial cooperatives, especially in the FCS associations, have been addressed little. Most of 
the literatures on patronage refunds have focused on the production or supply cooperatives 
(Beierlein and Schrader 1978, Knoeber and Baumer 1983, Royer 1987, 1993, Royer et. al. 1997, 
2007). Possible reasons of lacking research on financial cooperatives include the missing of 
consistent and clean dataset, and the difficulty of incorporating the regulation on the capital 
management of financial cooperatives.  
The general theory of cooperatives and the empirical studies on production cooperatives 
are valuable in analyzing the financial cooperatives. Yet FCS as a system of financial 
cooperatives has its distinctive features. For example, FCS association serves as the financial 
intermediation in the farm debt market. FCS is government sponsored enterprise (GSE). FCS‟s 
operation and capital management are strictly regulated for the safety consideration. As for the 
decision of whether and how much patronage refunds should be paid, there are many 
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determinants, such as the capital structure, the financial performance, the preference of the 
members, and the operational philosophy of the association‟s manager.  
This paper analyzes the evolution of patronage refunds of all FCS lending associations in 
the U.S. from 2000 to 2009. Both the time series pattern and the regional pattern of patronage 
refunds are examined. The characteristics of the associations who pay patronage refunds are 
compared with those associations who do not pay.  A logistic regression model with GEE 
adjustment is developed to identify the significant determinants in the decision of refunding 
patronage or not.  
This paper makes two contributions to the empirical studies in financial cooperatives. 
First, the paper utilizes a large panel dataset that includes all the FCS associations nationwide 
and over a 10 year time horizon. Therefore it is feasible to statistically identify, empirically test, 
and generally draw conclusions upon the systematic patterns in the patronage refunds paying 
behavior. Second, to my knowledge this is the first piece of work that investigates the 
determinants of patronage refunds paying decision in the agriculture financial cooperatives, 
especially in the FCS associations.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the concept and the forms of 
patronage refunds in the FCS associations. Section 3.3 reviews the relevant studies on the 
patronage refunds of cooperatives. Section 3.4 examines the time trend and regional pattern of 
associations‟ patronage refunds. Section 3.5 provides the dataset and the Logistic model 
specification. The characteristics of the associations who choose to make patronage refunds are 
summarized and compared to the associations who do not. Section 3.6 documents the primary 
findings and section 3.7 provides main conclusions based on the primary findings.  
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3.2 Understanding the Patronage Refunds 
In FCS associations, the patrons are also the members, the owners, the shareholders, and 
the borrowers. As mentioned, a farmer needs to choose either paying $1,000 or 2% of the loan 
amount, whichever is less, to become a member and then borrows from the FCS association.  
For example, Farmer A wants to borrow $80,000 so she purchases $1,000 of capital 
stock. Farmer B wants to borrow $60,000 so she purchases $1,000 share too. In the end of the 
year if that association returns patronage refunds, farmer A will receive more patronage refunds 
than farmer B even both of them purchase the same amount of capital stock, i.e. $1,000. The 
patronage refunds amount will be calculated on $80,000 and $60,000 respectively if the interest 
rates are the same and both loans are accrual. Therefore FCS‟s patronage refunds are distributed 
proportional to the member‟s usage of the business rather than member‟s capital contribution.  
It is common for associations retain partial or whole earnings for better service and 
continuous growth. Still the capital stock and retained earnings will be redeemed and returned 
gradually over years. In practice, the patronage refunds distributing procedure often works in a 
revolving method.  The revolving account is set up and has a term structure that pays certain 
amount back at each period over a certain time horizon and follows a first-in and first-out order.  
Table 3.1 gives simplified example to demonstrate how the patronage refund is 
distributed and recorded in the accounting book, i.e., in my data set. An association has two 
patrons: farmer A and farmer B. So the association‟s capital stock is $2,000 as the beginning 
balance. Earned Surplus is totaled at $120,000 including both unallocated and allocated 
accounts. Now suppose the current year net income is $4,000. The $4,000 is recorded into 
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unallocated account under Earned Surplus and is subjected to distribution. $20 is distributed 
directly as cash patronage refund. Another $1,000 is transferred from unallocated account into 
allocated account and ready for retirement in the future. For current year, $100 surplus is actually 
retired from the allocated account and is distributed as cash patronage refund and $40 capital 
stock is retired as well. In summary, the patronage refund in current year in total is $120, $20 as 
instant refund, $100 as refund from revolving account. This is also how I define patronage 
refunds in my models. Equity is increased by $3,920, which equals $4,000 net income - $160 
paid out patronage refunds and retired capital stock + $80 new issued capital stock.  
Table 3.1 is a simplified version of the patronage refunds distribution and revolving 
accounts. A sample Schedule RI-D „Changes in Net Worth‟ of a real FCS association is attached 
in Appendix A. The total patronage refunds amount for AgGeorgia Farm Credit, ACA in 
December 2007 equals $5,826,000 as instant refund plus $2,000 as revolving account refund.  
There are 63 out of 86 FCS associations paid patronage refunds in 2009 while only 74 out 
of 183 associations paid in 2000. This overall increasing trend of patronage refunds is different 
from the industrial firms „disappearing dividends‟ phenomenon (Fama and French 2001) and the 
„decline of dividend payers‟ in commercial banks (Haggard and Howe 2008). For FCS 
associations, paying out patronage refunds is a marketing tool to attract borrowers and also 
benefits the cooperative with tax exemptions. For the borrowers, receiving patronage refunds 
reduces patrons‟ total borrowing cost. It also gives patrons the cash to pay their income tax 
related to the member‟s earnings allocated.  
Even though for some associations paying patronage refunds can be a non-economic 
decision outcome, systematically analyzing the trend, the pattern and the possible determinants 
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of patronage refunds are still the important steps to fully understand the patronage refunds 
practice and its relation to the efficient capital management in FCS associations.  
3.3 Relevant Studies 
There are several articles targeting on the issue of patronage refunds in production and 
supply cooperatives. (Tubbs 1971, Dahl and Dobson 1976, Beierlein and Schrader 1978, 
Knoeber and Baumer 1983, VanSickle and Ladd 1983, Junge and Ginder 1986, Caves and 
Petersen 1986, Royer 1987, 1993, Royer and Shihipar 1997, and Royer and Smith 2007). 
However there was only one paper on the patronage refunds payment of financial cooperative: 
Briggeman and Jorgensen (2009) used survey data of one FCS association in Oklahoma and 
concluded that members strongly prefer patronage refunds compared to lower fixed real estate 
interest rate. 
The patronage refunds and patron valuation studies appeared in the literatures since 
1970s when the financial cost of equity capital in cooperatives started to be a popular topic in 
agricultural economics journals. Tubbs (1971) studied the impact of coop patronage refunds on 
the farm operations. He argued that low cash patronage refunds amount and long revolving fund 
terms may hurt the farmers in the sense of discounted present value because of the immediate tax 
obligation (Royer 2004).  
Dahl and Dobson (1976) chose three Wisconsin coops with 189 members as their data 
sample. They assumed fixed parameters and computed the cost of each capital sources under 
different scenarios and the smallest cost scenario was picked as the optimal capital structure. 
45 
 
Compared to 20%, 60%, 80% and 100% patronage refunded in cash scenario, 40% represents the 
optimal financial mix.  
Beierlein and Schrader  (1978) did similar research as Dahl and Dobson . They defined a 
base case capital structure of a representative farmer cooperative with 50% debt and 50% equity. 
They again assumed fixed parameters and deterministic simulator to compare capital structure 
and the after tax present value of patron benefits. Their illustration showed the complexity of the 
relationships among the capital structure of a cooperative and the generalization of particular 
capital plans was difficult because of the interaction with patron cash flows. An interest finding 
is that shortening the revolving fund cycle has only negligible effect on patron benefits.   
VanSickle and Ladd (1983) mathematically derived a model for the analyzing the 
economics of a cooperative‟s financial structure. The objective assumed by the coop is to 
maximize the total after-tax profits of the patrons with a set of constraints. Predetermined 
parameters were defined and a numerical searching algorithm was applied. They concluded that 
paying 70% of its patronage refunds in cash benefits the members more than paying 100% or 
20% in cash.  
Knoeber and Baumer (1983) developed a model of the cooperative members in order to 
understand the retained patronage refunds in agricultural cooperative. They assumed no tax, no 
dividends, and an absolute risk-averse utility function for farmers. Each farmer had only two 
assets, which are the assets used in farming operation and the retained patronage refunds in the 
coop. Each farmer maximized the expected utility function for the optimal share of retained 
patronage refunds. The median level of all the farmers‟ preferred shares would be selected by the 
cooperative.  
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The 1980‟s agricultural depression created tough time for agricultural cooperatives and 
FCS institutions. FCS institutions went through government assistance and organizational 
restructure. Related agricultural finance literatures focused on the loan portfolio deterioration and 
assets growth. Caves and Petersen (1986) showed that increasing the retention ratio of earnings 
accelerate coop‟s growth only in the short run. Junge and Ginder  (1986) showed that 20% cash 
patronage refunds may generate negative cash flow to patrons who belongs to low tax brackets. 
Cooperatives have to increase the cash patronage refunds, to shorten revolving periods, or to use 
nonqualified allocation of surplus that will not be considered as taxable. Fulton et al. (1995) also   
concluded that need for cooperatives to redeem the equity accumulated leads to a reduction in 
the growth rate. This implies that distributing patronage refunds will slow the cooperatives 
growth.  
Royer and Shihipar (1997) analyzed how the cash proportion of patronage refunds affects 
the cash flow of individual patrons and how the patron‟s preferences between cash amount and 
revolving period are affected by age and other factors. Diaz-Hermelo et al. (2001) incorporated 
member responses into the decision model of a cotton ginning cooperative. The member‟s 
production function was estimated from a survey data set. Then the member‟s production was 
incorporated into the cooperative‟s expected value of equity. The impacts and tradeoffs of 
alternative management strategies were simulated based on assumed parameters and weights. He 
concluded that decreasing cash patronage to increase stock redemption is a poor strategy.  
Royer and Smith  (2007) used adaptive expectation model on the estimation of patronage 
refunds expected by the member. The condition hold for equilibrium is that the marginal cost of 
production equal to the cash price offered by the coop plus the expected patronage refunds. They 
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presented that maximizing coop profit yields the lowest production and highest product price 
while maximizing member profit yields the highest production and lowest product price.  
Briggeman and Jorgensen (2009) paper is the first paper focused on FCS associations‟ 
patronage payments. They used survey data and a conjoint analysis to identify member‟s 
preference between cash patronage refunds versus lower fixed real estate interest rates. Their 
results showed that the preference for cash patronage payments is so high that on average the 
members are willing to pay higher interest rates. 
Patronage refunds problem has been an important topic in the agricultural cooperative 
research. In the beginning only one side, either the cooperative or the producer member side was 
investigated. Given fixed value of a set of parameters the impacts of changing patronage refunds 
ratio and changing the revolving term were evaluated either on the cooperative‟s capital structure 
or on the member‟s profitability. Eventually the researches moved towards on how to incorporate 
the responses of the member producers into the capital management of the cooperatives. Models 
also captured the relation between the member and the cooperative in a dynamic and stochastic 
way.  
Except the Briggeman and Jorgensen paper, no economic research has been done directly 
on FCS institutions. The Briggeman and Jorgensen paper used 174 observations on surveys data 
that is based on one FCS association. This may produce less general conclusion on the overall 
preference of patronage refunds. Therefore it is meaningful to conduct analysis with a rich 
dataset and thoroughly investigated the determinants of patronage refunds at the cooperatives 
side.  
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3.4 Time Trend and Regional Pattern 
Some FCS associations pay out patronage regularly, some pay it occasionally and some 
just never pay. From 2000 to 2009, among the total 1187 observations there are 763 observations 
of paying patronage refunds. In 2000 there were totally 195 associations and after years of 
mergers there were only 91 left in 2009. Even the total number of association is decreasing the 
proportion of associations who distributes patronage refunds is increasing. It is observed that 
more associations start to pay patronage refunds and start to pay more patronage refunds. Figure 
3.1 clearly indicates the trends.  
In Figure 3.1, the percentage of payers equals to the number of associations who paid 
patronage refund over the total number of associations in that year. 42.05% associations paid 
patronage refunds in 2000. The percentage increased to 89.47% in 2007, which is the peak year. 
The columns indicate that the total amount of patronage refunds in million dollars. The total 
patronage refunds also rise since 2000. Both the percentage of payers and the total amount of 
patronage refunds decrease in 2008 and 2009 because of the financial crisis and stress 
experienced by FCS associations.  
There are currently five district banks (CoBank, AgFirst, AgriBank, FCB Texas, and US 
AgBank) serving the lending associations in its district (See the territory map in Figure 2.2). 
Although associations can get involved with other associations‟ operation outside their own 
disctrict via loan participation and loan syndications, the service that associations offer to their 
member farmers has a bounded territory. Therefore within district consistency and across district 
variety are expected for the associations‟ patronage refund policies. 
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Figure 3.2 gives the percentage of associations paid patronage refunds by regions. Data 
since 2003 are used because the current five regions were structured from that year. CoBank and 
AgFirst associations are regular payers. In fact all the CoBank region associations pay patronage 
refunds for all the years. It is obvious that more and more associations in AgriBank, US AgBank 
and FCB Texas pay patronage refunds between 2003 and 2007. In 2008 and 2009, the financial 
stress, economy recession including the rising commodity prices faced by FCS caused the 
decline of the number of payers as well as the amount of patronage refunds, especially in FCB 
Texas district. 
3.5 Data Description and Model Specification 
3.5.1 Data and Variables 
Currently Call Report
8
 data between March 2000 and December 2009 are downloaded 
and processed for the Logistic regression analysis.
 9
 I propose that the decision of whether paying 
the patronage refund or not is affected by the following eight factors: size, profitability, 
profitability from previous period, capital adequacy, retained earnings, credit risk, interest 
margin, and tax. After merging quarterly schedules and generating annual variables, I have 1187 
valid observations over 10 years. The dataset is unbalanced because of the continuous mergers of 
associations and combination of districts.   
 The Size variable is defined as the logarithm of total loans. Profit is defined as Return on 
Assets (ROA) that equals Net income/Assets. Lag_profit is the ROA of pervious year. EA ratio 
(or capital ratio) is measured as the ratio of total net worth over total assets. It measures the 
                                                 
8
 http://www2.fdic.gov/Call_TFR_Rpts/inform.asp 
9
 http://www.fca.gov/exam/data_download.html 
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capital adequacy. High EA ratio indicates low leverage and adequate capital reserve. URE is 
defined as the unallocated retained earnings over the earned surplus. It measures the proportion 
of earnings that is retained as unallocated. Interest is defined as the total interest income minus 
the total interest expense and divided by the total accrual loans, which indicates the interest 
margin. Credit risk is defined as the nonaccrual loans over total loans, i.e. the proportion of bad 
loans. It measures the loan default risk. Tax is defined as taxes paid over EBIT (net income 
before income taxes and extraordinary items). Tax is expected to be a relatively stable value 
since associations face the same tax principle although the taxable income amount varies. The 
dependent variable Cash is defined as the patronage refunds that reduce the equity level for the 
current year. Table 3.2 gives the definitions of the variables.  
Means of the dependent and explanatory variables are compared between the associations 
who pay patronage and those who do not pay in Table 3.3. The second column „Payer‟ shows the 
status of paying patronage refunds or not. „Y‟ represents a payer while „N‟ represents a non 
payer. In order to keep the factors within a comparable magnitude, ratios such as profit, EA, 
URE, credit, interest and tax are multiplied by 100 to become percentages. Cash unit is dollar in 
thousand and size is the logarithm value of total loans in thousand dollars.  
By the comparison of mean values of the two groups, it looks like the associations who 
pay patronage refunds are larger, have lower EA ratio, have less unallocated retained earnings, 
are less profitable, have lower credit risk, charge higher interest margin, and pay less tax than the 
patronage non-payers. The explanatory variables‟ comparison clearly displays the differences 
between payers and non-payers, therefore the decision of paying patronage refunds or not paying 
is worth further analysis. 
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3.5.2 Logistic GEE model  
Usually FCS associations decide whether or not to distribute patronage refunds first, then 
decide on how much patronage refunds to be distributed. The analysis will focus on the whether 
or not to pay decision first. 
A binary logistic regression is estimated for prediction of the probability of occurrence 
when the dependent is a dichotomy with occurring and not occurring two outcomes. Logistic 
regression is used to assess the interaction effects between dependent and independents, to 
determine the effect size, to rank the importance of independents, and to understand the impacts 
from the independents. Usually the impacts are explained in terms of odds ratios. Logistic 
regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring. Logistic regression calculates changes 
in the log odds of the dependent, not changes in the dependent itself as OLS regression does. 
The dependent variable iY follows a binomial distribution with 1 as paying patronage 
refunds and 0 as not paying patronage refunds. The probability of paying patronage refunds takes 
the form )|( i
i
i
i X
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Y
Ep  . The logit of the odds is modeled as a linear function of iX .
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 A logistic regression has fewer restrictions therefore is advantageous compared to OLS. 
The independent variables can be of any type. It does not assume the linear relationship between 
dependent variable and independent variables; it does not require normality of variables; and it 
does not assume homoscedasticity of the error term. But the logistic model requires that the 
observations are independent. Since my longitudinal dataset does have repeated measures on the 
same association over years, the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) method is used to 
account for the correlations among the observations of the same association over years.  
GEE method in Liang and Zeger‟s paper (1986), was used to analyze clustered binary 
data. The same association observed over years can be considered as a cluster as well. The 
observations within one cluster are likely to be correlated. The dependent variable still takes 0 or 
1 two values and it now has two dimensions. It is defined as itY , Ni ,...,2,1  identifies the 
associations and iTt ,...,2,1  identifies the years. 
The advantage of GEE logit is that it does not require any joint distribution of the 
dependent variables within the cluster yet still yields consistent and asymptotically normal 
estimates for the regression parameters even the covariance structure of the clustered data is mis-
specified (Liang and Zeger 1986). The model is expressed as 
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where itX
 
is the independent variables vector and itp  is the conditional mean of paying 
patronage refunds given itX  . In order to correct the correlation between the observations within 
the cluster, a ii TT  working correlation matrix )(R is assumed.  
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The correlation matrix depends on a vector of correlation parameters  and parameters 
are shared by all associations. They represent the average dependence among the repeated 
observations across associations. The correlation structure )(R can take different forms such as 
independent, exchangeable, unstructured, or autoregressive. Since the patronage refunds decision 
is probably affected by the previous patronage refunds, an auto regressive structure is assumed.  
Define iA to be the ii TT  diagonal matrix containing the variance under model (3.3) with 
)1( itit pp  as the diagonal element  )1( ititi ppdiagA  . Then the working covariance or 
within cluster covariance for iY  can be expressed as
2/12/1
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where iii AXD '' is the matrix of 
independent variable values and iS is the vector with t th element the residual ititit pys  . Then 
the GEE estimator ˆ
 
is found by solving the full set of estimating equations: 
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Different software packages use different numerical method to solve the quasi-likelihood 
estimate in (3.4). SAS GENMOD is often used to analyze binary responses with correlated data. 
The GENMOD procedure in SAS allows the extension of traditional linear model theory to 
generalized linear models. It allows the mean of a population to depend on a linear independent 
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variable through a nonlinear link function. STATA XTLOGIT offers the same estimation 
procedure but with fewer optimization options (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Therefore I use 
SAS GENMOD to fit the FCS data set. The REPEATED statement allows me to specify the 
clustering information and choose the working correlation matrix for GEE.  
The fitting algorithm utilized in SAS GENMOD includes several steps. First compute an 
initial estimate of   from an ordinary generalized linear model (GLM). Second, an auto 
regressive working correlation matrix at degree one is assumed to estimate the dependence 
between response and covariates. The residual from the GLM model is used to estimate the 
covariance iV  among observations of the same association. Then the estimated covariance is used 
to conduct the second round of estimation of the parameters  .   will be updated as: 
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This iteration is repeated until the difference between two successive estimates are very 
small, i.e., get converged. 
3.6 Primary Results 
3.6.1 Multicollinearity Check and Dummy Variable Definition 
First the multicollinearity is checked among the continuous independent variables since 
financial ratios are usually highly correlated. The existence of multicollinearity inflates the 
variances of the parameter estimates. That may result in the lack of statistical significance of 
individual independent variables while the overall model may be strongly significant. 
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Multicollinearity may also result in wrong signs and magnitudes of regression coefficient 
estimates, and consequently in incorrect conclusions about relationships between independent 
and dependent variables. 
Table 3.4 examines the Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor for each variable. Since 
for each independent variable, Tolerance = 1 – Rsq, where Rsq is the coefficient of 
determination for the regression of that variable on all remaining independent variables, low 
values indicate high multivariate correlation. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 1/Tolerance 
and it is always >= 1. It is the number of times the variance of the corresponding parameter 
estimate is increased due to multicollinearity as compared to as it would be if there were no 
multicollinearity. Values of VIF exceeding 10 are often regarded as indicating multicollinearity. 
In weaker models, which is often the case in logistic regression, values above 2.5 may cause a 
concern (P.D. Allison, Logistic Regression Using the SAS System, SAS Institute, 1999). All VIF 
values of the independent variables are less than 2.5 in my model so the independent variables 
passed the multicollinearity test. 
Besides the independent variables, the Logit model also includes five bank district 
dummy variables in order to capture the regional pattern of paying decision. The problem is that 
CoBank associations always pay patronage refunds. If the logit model includes a Cobank 
dummy, the dependent variable and an independent variable take same value all the time. The 
logistic model with GEE cannot generate positive definite Hessian matrix. However, if I can only 
keep the associations in FCB Texas, AgriBank, AgFirst, and US AgBank, I lose almost 30% of 
the observations. Therefore I form a new group of associations with all the associations that do 
not belong to the above four districts: district 30 (Big30). This big group includes all CoBank 
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associations and the associations outside FCB Texas, AgriBank, AgFirst, and US AgBank (those 
associations existed before 2003‟s final merger). Therefore I am able to keep the total 
observations valid and remove the multicollinearity between the dependent variable and the 
CoBank dummy. 
3.6.2 Understand the Estimation Outcomes 
The estimated logistic GEE model is defined as: 
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Table 3.5 lists the parameter estimates, standard error, confidence intervals, Z-scores, and 
p-values in the initial GLM. GLM estimates are used as initial values for GEE solution. A 
complete SAS statistics output is attached as Appendix B. If the logistic model is estimated as 
ordinary GLM, i.e., the correlation structure within cluster is assumed as independent, intercept, 
size, EA ratio, URE ratio, credit, interest, tax and  FCB Texas, AgFirst, US Agbank district 
dummies are significant explanatory variables.  
However, after adjusting the autoregressive correlation structure within the cluster, 
intercept, size, EA, interest, and FCB Texas, AgFirst, US Agbank dummies remain significant. 
Profit, URE and Tax are not significant any more. Table 3.6 provides the estimation information 
for GEE logit. The decision of paying patronage refunds or not depends on the associations‟ size, 
capital structure, interest margin, and the location of district bank. Size, EA, interest margin, and 
the three dummies all have positive effects on the odds ratio. Model is refitted with only 
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significant factors only. Since the coefficients are the estimates of   for the odds ratio function, 
the estimated probability function is derived as: 
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To compare the influence on the probability of paying patronage refunds, I define a 
baseline scenario where the explanatory variables equal to the mean values in 2009 computed in 
Table 3.3. Based on the baseline scenario, the probability of paying patronage refunds equals 
0.4194, which is computed from (3.5). Given all other variables constant, the probability of 
paying is computed again when one explanatory variable increases by 10% at each time. Table 
3.7 summarizes the marginal effects on the probability of paying with respect to the changing 
explanatory variables.  
From Table 3.7, 10% growth in total loans size can increase the probability of paying 
patronage refunds by 0.172. 10% growth in capital structure (EA ratio) can increase the 
probability by 0.0306. 10% growth in the interest margin, i,e, a higher interest rate charged on 
loans, can increase the probability by 0.0296. In the decision of whether or not distributing 
patronage refunds, the size of the association has larger impact than the capital structure and the 
interest rate charged if all factors change at the same scale.  
In addition, being an association of which district also matters. Figure 3.2 already 
demonstrates that associations in CoBank and AgFirst have very high percentage of payers. This 
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is evidenced by the marginal effect of being an AgFirst association. Being an AgFirst association 
can largely increase the probability of paying by 0.5756. Being a FCB Texas association and 
being a US Agbank association have almost same impacts on the probability of paying. Both ca 
increase the probability of paying by about 0.3. This is also comparable to the trend showed in 
Figure 3.2. The percentage of payers trends are similar between FCB Texas and US Agbank. On 
the other hand, being a AgriBank association does not significantly improve the paying 
probability. In Figure 3.2, AgriBank indeed has lower payer percentage in most years.  
 When it comes to the declare of paying or not paying patronage refunds in a year, the 
profitability, the performance of loans, the tax burden, and the retained earnings are not 
important predictors. “How big the association is” and “Where the association is located” are the 
two most influential factors. Meanwhile EA ratio and interest margin also affect the probability 
of paying patronage refunds. However the set of relevant factors may change when it comes to 
the analysis of the decision of how much patronage refunds shall be distributed. That „how 
much‟ decision is investigated in the Chapter Four.  
3.6.3 Goodness of Fit and Robustness Check 
GEE has become a popular regression method for correlated binary data. However 
methods to access the goodness of fit are limited. From the goodness of fit criteria of the 
generalized linear model (GLM) in Table 3.8, Scaled Deviance and Pearson‟s Chi-square 
statistics are close to 1, which indicates no overdispersion or underdispersion. The Cook‟s D is 
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used to detect outliers when the value is greater than n/4  as a rule of thumb. One association is 
removed because of the extremely large Cook‟s D value.10 
Because GEE is not estimated by maximum likelihood and the residuals within cluster 
are correlated, traditional tests such as the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and BIC 
(Bayesian Information Criterion) are not appropriate to compare models. Pan 2001 suggested 
using the QIC (Quasilikelihood under the Independence Model Criterion) that is analogous to the 
AIC in evaluating models fit with correlated data. The comparability between AIC and QIC is 
explained thoroughly by Hardin and Hilbe (2007). 
The GEE model‟s QIC values for three types of working correlation matrix are listed as 
well as the model fitting information in Table 3.9. AR represents an autoregressive with-in 
subject correlation. IN represents an independent correlation. EXCH represents an exchangeable 
correlation. All three are commonly used assumptions on the working correlation matrix used in 
GEE. Indeed the QIC with AR correlation structure is smaller than EXCH and IN. Model with 
smaller QIC provides better model fitness. Therefore the autoregressive degree one assumption 
of the working correlation structure is a good choice.  
The diagnostic graphs are plotted in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 shows that the raw residuals 
and the Pearson‟s residuals. Both of them do not show any systematic trend that indicates lack of 
model fitness. In the GEE diagnostic statistics plots, Leverage, Cook‟s D and DFITS are used to 
assess outliers. 99% of the observations are located within the safe region. 
11
 
                                                 
10 Louisiana Ag Credit, ACA with Uninum=710032 and Year 2005. Data recording error is detected. 
 
11
 Safe regions are defined as Leverage < 0.24, Cook‟s D < 0.004, and DFITS < 0.21. 
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Since the correlation structure is the key in the GEE algorithm, I rerun the model with 
different assumption on the correlation structures and see how the estimates are affected. Table 
3.10 lists the estimates from an autoregressive correlation (AR), an exchangeable correlation 
(EXCH), and an independent correlation (IN). In fact, the IN estimates are the same as the 
estimates in GLM in Table 3.5 since the correlation within cluster is assumed as independent.  
The logistic GEE estimates from EXCH and IN are both close to AR estimates. Actually the 
estimates from EXCH and IN all located within the 95% confidence interval of the AR estimates. 
It is verified that the estimates only change slightly for various working correlation structures. 
Therefore the logistic GEE gives robust estimates on the dependence between paying patronage 
refunds and the explanatory variables. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Although there is a temporal pattern of more and more associations paying patronage 
refunds, associations in different bank districts show different preference on patronage refunds 
policy. Some choose to consistently return part of the earnings back to the members as patronage 
refunds while some never distribute any patronage refunds. A logistic GEE model is fitted to 
investigate the dependence of the patronage refunds paying decision on a group of possible 
significant explanatory variables, such as the profitability, the loans size, the capital structure, the 
margin of interest, the credit risk, and the tax burden. Districts dummies (FCB Texas, AgFirst, 
AgriBank, US Agbank, and others) are included as well. 
Among the proposed explanatory variables, these are the significant ones: size, interest 
margin, EA ratio, FCB Texas dummy, AgFirst dummy and US Agbank dummy. With the 
marginal effects illustrated in Table 3.7, the importance of the predictors‟ impact can be ranked 
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as: being a AgFirst association, being a FCB Texas or being a US Agbank association, size of the 
total loans, equity capital level, and the interest margin charged.  
It is true that the patronage refunds policy sometimes is a non economic decision made 
by the management at individual association level. It can be triggered by quite specific reason, 
such as competing and marketing tool, lump sum cash for member‟s income tax, or 
corresponding response to the district bank‟s patronage policy change. Yet the logistic GEE 
model conducted with good model fitness in this paper provides empirical evidence on the 
relationships between important predictors and the patronage refunds paying decision among 
FCS associations.   
In the theory of corporate finance dividends tend to be paid by mature firms who have 
higher profitability but lower growth rate. It is referred as the life-cycle theory in dividends 
literature (Fama and French 2001, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 2002, DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz 2006). Since both dividends and patronage refunds are ways to share 
earnings with shareholders, the life cycle theory is checked on patronage refunds and the 
relationships on profitability and growth rate are not found in the FCS associations. Making high 
net income does not give the FCS associations incentive to start to distribute patronage refunds. 
On the other hand, the increasing total loans size of an association does improve the probability 
of paying patronage refunds. This difference actually is meaningful. After all patronage refunds 
are based on the contribution to the net income made by member users and dividends are based 
on the capital stocks held by members. Compared to patronage refunds, dividends of FCS 
associations are a lot more stable and in much less magnitude. Unlike the commercial banks, 
FCS is a regulated cooperative system and the goal of operation is not maximizing the return of 
shareholder‟s investment but providing agricultural credit at the lowest cost.  
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 Beside the size of an association, the capital structure, i.e. the EA ratio, and the interest 
margin determine the paying decision as well. The more equity capital built, the larger interest 
margin, the more likely an association decides to return patronage refunds to the members. The 
positive relationship between interest margin and patronage refunds should be emphasized. 
Although a lower interest rate is normally considered as an explicit therefore attractive method to 
attract borrowers, the farmer borrowers really should give it second thoughts when the interest 
margin and patronage refunds are correlated. The logistic GEE model does not provide causality 
conclusion, it just demonstrates that the association can possibly stop paying patronage refunds if 
it charges a low interest rate, i.e., reduces its interest margin. A lower interest rate on loans does 
not guarantee an actually lower borrowing cost. 
Paying versus not paying patronage refunds is the very first decision faced by FCS 
association management when it comes to share earnings with members. Future analysis on how 
much patronage refund is decided will help understand the allocation and capital management of 
the equity in FCS associations better. Therefore the next step is to use the patronage refunds cash 
amount and to evaluate the association‟s decision on how much should be distributed. The 
analysis of the term structure of revolving account is not approachable in statistical models 
because of the data limitation. A simulation model may be preferred in order to add the revolving 
account to the analysis of patronage refunds.  
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Patronage Refunds Distribution in the FCS Accounting Book 
  
  
Capital Stock 
  
Earned Surplus  
Equity 
  Allocated Unallocated 
Beginning Balance 2,000 40,000 80,000 122,000 
Net Income 0 0 4,000 4,000 
Patronage Refund 0 1,000 -1,020 -20 
Retirement of Capital and Surplus -40 -100 0 -140 
Issued Stock 80 0 0 80 
Ending Balance 2,040 40,900 82,980 125,920 
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Table 3.2: Variable Definitions and Calculation Formula 
Variable  Calculation using variables  
from the call report 
Definition 
cash= -(TOTNW_80+ALSUR_100) patronage from current earnings plus 
patronage from revolving account 
size= LOG(ACRLNS+NONACR) logarithm of accrual loans and 
nonaccrual loans 
profit=  NETY/ASSETS net income over total assets, ROA 
lag_profit= LAG(NETY/ASSETS) last year‟s profit 
EA=  NETWRTH/ASSETS net worth over total assets 
URE= URE/EARNNW unallocated retained earnings over 
earned surplus 
credit= NONACR/(ACRLNS+NONACR) nonaccrual loans over total loans 
interest = (TINTINC-TOTINTEXT)/ACRLNS interest income minus interest expense 
over accrual loans 
tax= TAXES/BFORTAX tax over the net income before tax after 
but after interest cost 
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Table 3.3: Mean of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables (all in percentage except cash and 
size) 
Year Payer cash size profit lag_profit EA URE credit interest tax 
2000 N 0 11.92 1.75 1.83 25.72 94.01 0.99 2.95 12.63 
 
Y 2393.68 12.10 2.02 1.92 23.35 78.19 0.88 3.18 10.87 
2001 N 0 12.23 1.25 1.31 18.96 95.28 1.09 2.38 10.05 
 
Y 3550.46 12.37 1.90 1.83 18.89 80.81 0.76 2.95 3.02 
2002 N 0 12.73 1.27 1.29 17.68 96.23 0.67 2.29 11.38 
 
Y 3376.68 12.72 1.50 1.46 17.71 79.71 0.80 2.41 5.22 
2003 N 0 12.84 1.24 1.36 17.82 96.40 1.00 2.05 6.74 
 
Y 4160.67 12.77 1.75 1.65 17.60 79.88 0.86 2.54 2.74 
2004 N 0 12.94 3.12 3.44 18.30 99.90 0.60 2.87 5.96 
 
Y 5977.37 12.91 3.50 3.31 18.12 82.69 0.66 2.98 2.53 
2005 N 0 12.98 1.69 1.85 18.65 98.25 0.48 2.91 2.74 
 
Y 6476.00 13.01 2.05 2.04 18.78 85.07 0.44 2.96 8.22 
2006 N 0 12.83 1.62 1.56 20.42 99.33 0.52 2.80 2.87 
 
Y 6583.28 13.16 1.89 1.90 17.58 85.57 0.36 2.74 1.10 
2007 N 0 13.39 1.70 1.67 19.80 100.00 0.43 2.68 4.02 
 
Y 7102.05 13.17 1.89 1.89 17.24 86.30 0.47 2.77 1.29 
2008 N 0 13.28 0.99 1.33 17.91 100.00 0.82 2.24 2.41 
 
Y 6665.71 13.34 1.48 1.43 16.76 85.58 0.99 2.48 1.58 
2009 N 0 13.07 0.71 1.26 17.08 93.08 2.57 2.60 2.76 
 
Y 5363.79 13.46 1.15 1.02 16.76 80.45 2.33 2.61 1.57 
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Table 3.4: Collinearity Diagnostics   
Variable DF 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-value Pr > |t| Tolerance 
Variance 
Inflation 
Intercept 1 -37891 2462.6 -15.39 <.0001 . 0 
size 1 3146.24 151.7 20.74 <.0001 0.6657 1.5021 
profit 1 31452 23008 1.37 0.1719 0.5210 1.9193 
lag_profit 1 43170 19165 2.25 0.0245 0.7086 1.4113 
ea 1 19342 4101.89 4.72 <.0001 0.6542 1.5285 
URE 1 -7064.87 747.28 -9.45 <.0001 0.8564 1.1677 
credit 1 -14449 14891 -0.97 0.3321 0.8721 1.1467 
interest 1 93980 21439 4.38 <.0001 0.6728 1.4863 
tax 1 481.9501 749.76 0.64 0.5205 0.9272 1.0785 
 
Note: A Variance Inflation greater than 10 in normal model or greater than 2.5 in weak model 
indicates multicollinearity. 
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Table 3.5: Initial Estimates of the Logistic Model with Bank Dummies 
Parameter DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Likelihood Ratio 
Confidence 
 95% 
Limits 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > 
Chi-Sq 
Intercept 1 -6.9377* 1.449 -9.8085 -4.1218 22.93 <.0001 
size 1 0.4369* 0.083 0.2759 0.6018 27.68 <.0001 
profit 1 20.456 12.0596 -2.8558 44.495 2.88 0.0898 
lag_profit 1 -11.9994 9.7377 -31.4451 6.7975 1.52 0.2179 
ea 1 8.1238* 2.1363 3.9454 12.3501 14.46 0.0001 
URE 1 -1.5726* 0.5467 -2.6937 -0.5412 8.28 0.004 
credit 1 -16.6302* 8.3121 -33.1716 -0.5859 4 0.0454 
interest 1 50.2823* 11.2929 28.3025 72.6278 19.83 <.0001 
tax 1 -3.4974* 0.8175 -5.1426 -1.9348 18.31 <.0001 
FCB Texas 1 0.8925* 0.2094 0.4845 1.306 18.17 <.0001 
AgFirst  1 4.9985* 0.7585 3.7353 6.8571 43.43 <.0001 
AgriBank 1 0.1147 0.2306 -0.3384 0.5665 0.25 0.6189 
US AgBank 1 0.8493* 0.2056 0.449 1.256 17.06 <.0001 
Big 30 0 0 0 0 0 . . 
Scale 0 1 0 1 1 
   
Note: * indicates significant coefficient at 5% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
Table 3.6: GEE Estimates of the Logit Model with Bank Dummies 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Limits Z  Pr > |Z| 
Intercept -8.0114* 2.0201 -11.9707 -4.052 -3.97 <.0001 
size 0.476* 0.1265 0.228 0.724 3.76 0.0002 
profit 13.9848 9.7142 -5.0547 33.0243 1.44 0.15 
lag_profit -7.1188 8.0281 -22.8537 8.616 -0.89 0.3752 
ea 6.5931* 2.4611 1.7694 11.4168 2.68 0.0074 
URE -0.7121 0.5877 -1.864 0.4397 -1.21 0.2256 
credit -16.4496 10.0036 -36.0562 3.157 -1.64 0.1001 
interest 41.0551* 10.0855 21.2878 60.8224 4.07 <.0001 
tax -1.5576 0.9135 -3.3481 0.2328 -1.71 0.0882 
Texas 1.0799* 0.2577 0.5748 1.585 4.19 <.0001 
Agfirst  5.3616* 0.7721 3.8483 6.8749 6.94 <.0001 
AgriBank 0.2051 0.4758 -0.7275 1.1377 0.43 0.6665 
U.S. AgBank 1.1066* 0.3292 0.4613 1.7519 3.36 0.0008 
Big 30 0 0 0 0 0 . 
 
 
Note: * indicates significant coefficient at 5% significance level. 
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Table 3.7: The Marginal Effects on Probability of Paying Patronage Refunds 
 
Size EA Interest Margin Being the association of 
Mean Values 2009 12.88 18.53% 2.68% 
 
 
 
Baseline Probability 
 = 0.4194     
 
 
 
Size EA Interest Margin FCB Texas AgFirst US Agbank 
+10% from 2009 Means  14.16 20.38% 2.95% 
 
 
 
New Probability 0.5915 0.45 0.449 0.7099 0.995 0.7078 
∆ Probability 0.172 0.0306 0.0296 0.29 0.5756 0.288 
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Table 3.8: Model fitness of GLM 
Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit of GLM 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF 
Deviance 1165 1156.046 0.9923 
Scaled Deviance 1165 1156.046 0.9923 
Pearson Chi-Square 1165 1500.33 1.2878 
Scaled Pearson X2 1165 1500.33 1.2878 
Log Likelihood  -578.02  
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Table 3.9: GEE Model Fitting Information 
                                 
GEE Model Information  
Correlation Structure AR(1) 
Subject Effect UNINUM (313 levels) 
Number of Clusters 313 
Clusters With Missing Values 13 
Correlation Matrix Dimension 10 
       AR                       QIC         1175.8366 
       EXCH                     QIC         1180.7751 
       IN                            QIC         1178.0059 
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Table 3.10: Logit GEE Estimated with Different Working Correlation Structures 
AR EXCH IND 
Parameter Estimate Z 95% confidence Estimate Z Estimate Z 
Intercept -8.0114 -3.97 [-11.97,  -4.05] -8.7719 -4.13 -6.9377 -2.96 
Std Err/P-value 2.02 <.0001   
  
0.51 <.0001 1.45 0.0031 
size 0.476 3.76 [0.23, 0.72] 0.5081 3.88 0.4369 3.12 
Std Err/P-value 0.13 0.0002   
  
0.13 0.0001 0.14 0.0018 
profit 13.9848 1.44 [-5.05, 33.02] 9.5276 0.93 20.456 1.5 
Std Err/P-value 9.71 0.15   
  
10.2 0.35 13.67 0.13 
lag_profit -7.1188 -0.89 [-22.85,8.62] -12.4218 -1.36 -11.9994 2.78 
Std Err/P-value 
 
8.03 0.38  9.11 0.17 11.05 0.0054 
ea 6.5931 2.68 [1.77, 11.42] 7.2454 2.87 8.1238 2.78 
Std Err/P-value 2.46 0.0074   
  
2.52 0.004 2.92 0.0054 
URE -0.7121 -1.21 [-1.86, 0.44] -0.4815 -0.81 -1.5726 -1.75 
Std Err/P-value 0.59 0.2256   
  
0.597 0.42 0.9 0.08 
credit -16.4496 -1.64 [-36.06, 3.18] -12.8684 -1.2 -16.6302 -1.43 
Std Err/P-value 10 0.1   
  
10.73 0.23 11.64 0.15 
interest 41.0551 4.07 [21.29, 60.82] 50.0241 4.28 50.2823 3.65 
Std Err/P-value 10.09 <.0001   
  
11.7 <.0001 13.76 0.0003 
Tax -1.5576 -1.71 [-3.35, 0.23] -2.7561 -2.65 -3.4974 -2.84 
Std Err/P-value 0.91 0.089   
  
1.04 0.081 1.23 0.0045 
DIST10 1.0799 4.19 [0.57, 1.59] 1.0599 3.94 0.8925 3.26 
Std Err/P-value 0.26 <.0001   
  
0.27 <.0001 0.27 0.0011 
DIST20 5.3616 6.94 [3.85, 6.87] 5.9046 4.41 4.9985 6.67 
Std Err/P-value 0.77 <.0001   
  
1.34 <.0001 0.75 <.0001 
DIST22 0.2051 0.43 [-0.73, 1.14] 0.1036 0.21 0.1147 0.23 
Std Err/P-value 0.48 0.667   
  
0.49 0.83 0.49 0.81 
DIST24 1.1066 3.36 [0.46, 1.75] 1.0478 3.15 0.8493 2.42 
Std Err/P-value 0.33 0.0008   
  
0.33 0.0016 0.35 0.0157 
Note: Values in the parentheses are the standard error of each estimate. Values below the Z 
scores are the p-value.  
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Patronage Refunds Dynamics in FCS, 2000-2009 
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Figure 3.2: Patronage Refunds Percentage of Payers by Regions, 2003-2009 
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Figure 3.3: Diagnostic Graphs of Logit GEE 
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CHAPTER 4 
A PANEL TOBIT MODEL ON PATRONAGE REFUNDS BY FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 
ASSOCIATIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
A cooperative provides a product or a service to members at the lowest cost rather than 
maximizing profits for investors. This principle suggests that a cooperative returns the net 
income to members according to the member‟s business with the cooperative. The returned 
income, i.e. the patronage refunds, represents a key operating characteristic of cooperatives: 
ownership benefits are in proportion to their usage by members. Although constitutionally every 
cooperative should distribute patronage refunds, in practice cooperative members often elect to 
retain part or all of the earnings in the cooperative to keep its operation on a safe and sound 
financial basis.  
In my data set, there are 763 out of 1187 observations in the FCS dataset that actually pay 
patronage refunds in cash. Among those that pay patronage refunds, some associations pay more 
and some associations pay less. The patronage refunds amount vary but the patronage refund 
policy in general is persistent between years.  
Table 4.1 summarizes the number of associations who keep the same patronage refund 
policy from the previous year and who do not. Since the refund policy is compared between two 
years continuously from year 2000 to year 2009, the observations in year 2000 disappear as 
missing observations. Other missing observations in the following years are generated from the 
associations‟ mergers and renames. „Keep the same‟ category includes those associations who 
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keep the same patronage refund policy as the previous year. Those who paid patronage refunds 
in the past year continue to pay this year. Those who did not pay last year still do not pay in this 
year. The “Start to pay” category includes those associations who switched from zero patronage 
refunds to positive patronage refunds. On the other hand, the “Stop paying” category includes 
those associations who switched from paying patronage refunds to not paying patronage refunds. 
It is clear that most of the associations tend to keep consistent patronage refund decisions. In 
years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, there were more associations who started than associations 
who stopped. In 2008 and 2009, FCS associations faced difficult financial conditions. There was 
a drop in the number of paying associations and an increase in the number of not-paying 
associations. This observation indicates the importance of checking the patronage refunds‟ state 
dependence between years when it comes to the decision of how much patronage refunds should 
be distributed. 
The purpose of this paper is to further analyze the behavior of patronage refunds among 
FCS associations. In contrast to the decision of whether or not to pay patronage in the previous 
paper, this paper focuses on the amount of patronage refunds paid in cash and investigates the 
relationship between the actual patronage refunds and the relevant explanatory variables. 
Because only zero or positive patronage refund amounts are observed, patronage refund is a 
censored dependent variable and a Tobit model is the appropriate approach. 
Before the Tobit model is specified, a variable paid_rate is defined as the ratio of 
patronage refunds over net income. It measures patronage refunds as a proportion of net income. 
Table 4.2 shows that paid_rate becomes stable when there are only five remaining regions after 
mergers. A high percentage of net income is paid as patronage refunds in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
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In 2008 and 2009 the net income and the patronage refunds are reduced. The econometrics 
applied in this paper also aim on explaining the changes of patronage refunds across different 
regions. 
4.2 Econometrics Arguments 
This section provides the discussion on econometrics. The FCS association data set is a 
panel data set across associations and years. Because of the associations‟ continuous mergers, the 
data set is an unbalanced panel data set. Since the patronage refunds are either zero or positive, 
the dependent variable is limited (censored) and a Tobit model is fitted (Tobin, 1958). In my data 
set around 30% of the observations have zero patronage refund, and they should not be dropped 
out. Because of the possible state dependence indicated in Table 4.1, a lagged dependent variable 
is included in the explanatory variables. All these factors can complex the regression and need 
some discussion before the model is specified. 
Two types of Tobit panel models are proposed: the random-effects Tobit model and the 
dynamic Tobit model. The random effects model is used because the individual differences 
between associations are considered random rather than fixed and estimable. Since the 
significance of regional dummies found in the Logit model, regional dummy variables are tested 
on the decision of how much to pay as well. Alternatively I estimate a dynamic Tobit model to 
test the dependence between current patronage refunds and previous patronage refunds. 
Therefore lagged patronage refund is included as one of the explanatory variable. Time invariant 
dummies and lagged dependent variable are both important, but unfortunately, cannot be 
estimated with one Tobit model. Hence we need to fit two models to explore the effects of both.  
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First I discuss the reason to select random-effects model. Second the random-effects 
Tobit model is specified and estimating techniques are discussed. Finally the dynamic panel 
Tobit model is elaborated. 
4.2.1 Random Effects Model 
Panel data resulted from a cross sectional (N) subject being periodically observed over a 
defined time frame (T). In this paper the subjects are the patronage refunds in cash and the 
relevant explanatory variables. The subjects are cross-measured about 100 FCS associations in 
10 years, which is a small T large N case. Panel data endows regression with a spatial dimension 
and a temporal dimension so the regression technique is different. The two major approaches are 
the fixed-effect model and the random-effect model.  
A simple panel data model is defined as: 
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where ity is the dependent variable, itX  is the column vector of explanatory variables defined in 
Table 4.3, and iti uv   
is the composite error term.  
If the section-related unobserved effects, which is represented by iv , is believed to be 
correlated to the explanatory variables, the fixed-effect model is usually preferred, and iv will be 
estimated as a different intercept for each section. If iv  is assumed to be uncorrelated to the 
explanatory variables, a random-effect model is preferred and iv  will be included in the 
idiosyncratic error term (Wooldridge, 2001). The model becomes 
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 ' ititit Xy    
The fixed-effect model is appropriate in some cases that the section-related unobserved 
effect is of interest and is estimated as intercept for each section; or the sample is the population; 
or a likelihood function is conditional on iv . If the sample is a random selection from the 
population, and section related time invariant effects are not of interest, the random-effect model 
is appropriate (Lee, 2002). 
In my model, the arguments of preferring a random-effect model are several. First, my 
panel data set has more than 100 associations (N) and only 10 time periods (T). Instead of 
estimating N different intercepts iv  in a fixed-effect model, I only estimate the coefficients for 
the explanatory variables in a random-effect model. This saves a lot of degrees of freedom. 
Second, I want to make statistical inferences on the FCS associations in general, not on each 
individual association. The unobserved time-invariant association-related effects iv  should be 
treated as random and are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. In fact, a 
fixed-effect model will not be able to estimate the observed time-invariant section-related 
effects, such as the bank regions, and the type of associations (Agricultural Credit Association or 
Farm Land Credit Association). Finally, my model includes the lagged patronage refunds 
because of the potential state dependence suggested in Table 4.1. Therefore the association 
specific effects are removed even if they do exist and may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. As a result, random-effect panel model should be adapted. In general, random-effect 
models are more attractive because observed characteristics that remain constant for each 
individual are retained in the regression model. 
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Figure 4.1 explores a subset of the panel data on the dependent variable, patronage 
refunds in cash. This subset of data is a balanced panel of associations who appear in the data set 
for all 10 years. It contains only 23 associations and 230 observations. Among these 23 
associations, 18 of them are Agricultural Credit Associations (ACA) in the AgFirst bank region 
and 5 of them are Farm Land Credit Associations (FLCA) in the FCB Texas bank region. The 
balanced data set only has 23 associations while the full unbalanced data set has more than 300 
different associations. However, the balanced subset provides a consistent observation on 
patronage refunds over the whole time interval without dropped observations or newly added 
observations.  
The top figure in Figure 4.1 plots the patronage refunds in straight lines for the 23 
associations. The associations with high patronage refunds have more volatile patronage refunds 
than the associations with low patronage refunds. The bottom figure in Figure 4.1 shows the 
density and the average level of patronage refunds in each year. The red line that represents the 
average patronage refund of the 23 associations over years is quite stable. It slowly increases and 
reaches the peak value in 2007. It has had a declining trend since 2007. 
From the relatively stable overlay of the 23 associations‟ patronage refunds, the 
heteroskedasticity across the ten years is not significant. It suggests the patronage refunds state 
dependence between years. A Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test helps to decide the model 
fitness between a pooled OLS model and a random-effect model (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). The 
null hypothesis is no panel effect therefore a pooled OLS is preferred. A Pesaran‟s test is 
conducted to test cross-sectional dependence (Cheng Hsiao, 2011). The null hypothesis is that 
residuals are not correlated across sections. A Wooldridge test is conducted to test serial 
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autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2001). The null hypothesis is no serial correlation. The results of 
these tests are summarized in Table 4.4. The null hypothesis in the Breush-Pagan test is rejected; 
therefore a random-effect model is preferred over the OLS model. There is no cross sectional 
dependence but there is serial correlation. From these tests of the subset of data it seems 
reasonable to assume a random-effect model rather than fix-effect model, and to use a 
dependence effect Tobit model for detecting serial correlation. 
4.2.2 Panel Tobit Estimation with Dummy Variables 
While there is a large amount of literature on linear panel data models, including both 
fixed-effects and random-effects, less has been discussed about limited dependent viable panel 
models, especially when the dependent variable is continuous and there is serial correlation. In 
G. S. Maddala‟s landmark paper (Maddala, 1987) on limited dependent variable models with 
panel data, he summarized some issues of serial correlation and state dependence with panel data 
and pointed to the complexity of the estimation of the Logit, Probit, and Tobit models with such 
type of dependent variable. Unfortunately, the dependent variable in my data set is censored, 
continuous and may have serial correlation. Discarding the zero observations is incorrect 
(Hausman, 1978). Therefore a random-effect Tobit panel model is proposed and serial 
correlation will be checked.  
A standard panel data Tobit model is defined as (Lee, 2002): 
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where the observed dependent variable is 
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ity  
represents the patronage refunds for the ith association at year t . itx  
represents the same set of 
explanatory variables used in the previous chapter‟s logit model, such as size, profit, tax, interest 
margin, credit risk, and capital structure. It is assumed that the error term itu is separated into a 
time invariant individual random effect, iv , and a time-varying idiosyncratic random error, it . 
Further, iv and it  are independent. The joint density function for the i
th 
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The panel level likelihood is:  
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for iT  observations in section i the likelihood contribution is 
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Therefore the log-likelihood for the whole sample is 
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Compared to the simple Tobit model, the panel Tobit model‟s log likelihood does not collapse in 
a sum and the feasible maximum likelihood estimation is available only for simple structured 
random disturbances. The default approximation of the log likelihood is by the adaptive M-point 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which approximates the panel level likelihood with 
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where mw
*
 denotes the quadrature weights and ma
*
 denotes the quadrature abscissas. iˆ and 
iˆ are the adaptive parameters for panel i . Therefore with the definition of ),,( iitit vxyg the 
log likelihood is approximated by the sum of the logs of the panel level likelihood iL  . 
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The default method of the adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature is to calculate the new mean and 
variance and use those parameters for iˆ and iˆ  by following the method of Smith and Naylor 
(2001), further discussed in Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004). The program starts with 
1ˆ 0, i and 0ˆ 0, i and the means and variances are updated in the following iterations. The 
algorithm to estimate a random effects Tobit panel model can be summarized as (Bruno, 2004): 
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1) Run a GLS estimation with the original censored data to fix the initial values for the 
means and the variances.  
2) Sample the censored variables from the probability density function to build the 
augmented dataset. 
3) Run a GLS estimation on the panel with augmented dataset to compute new values for 
the mean and variances. 
4) Save the estimators and estimate the individual effects using the residuals saved. 
5) Derive the new mean and variances, repeat the iterations until the mean and variance 
converge for the maximization algorithm. 
STATA‟s xttobit procedure provides the program to conduct these steps.  
4.2.3 Dynamic Panel Tobit Model 
The patronage refunds can be either zero or any positive value. A dynamic panel data 
Tobit model can be specified as (Wawro, 2002; Wansbeek and Kapteyn, 1989): 
i t
P
p i pp
K
k i tkktii t
wxyy     11 ,1,  ,  (1,.... )i N , (1,.... )t T   (4.1) 
ity = cash amount paid as patronage refunds: Cash 
, 1i ty  = cash amount paid as patronage refunds in previous year: Cash(t-1) 
kx = time varying explanatory variables: Profitability, Capital-adequacy, URE, Size, 
Credit-risk, Interest-margin, Tax. 
pw = time invariant explanatory variables: Region dummy, Association type dummy. 
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itiit uv   is a composite error term 
(1,.... )i N  denotes associations and (1,.... )t T denotes years 
Since the lagged dependent variable is included in the regression, a Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator is used to adjust for the autocorrelation of the dependent variable, 
the heterogeneity in cross sections, and the endogeneity of explanatory variables. A dynamic 
panel Tobit model explicitly specifies the lagged dependent variable. It helps adjust the dynamics 
of patronage refunds between years. Under such model setup appropriate instrumental variables 
are needed to purge the correlation.  
The dynamic panel model is estimated in two steps (Hu, 2002). First the estimates of the 
variance of effects are obtained via a proper instrument variable matrix and a weighting factor 
matrix is formed. Second the estimation proceeds with a generalized linear square regression on 
the partial deviations from the group means. Since exogeneity is not likely among the 
explanatory factors in my model, GMM is applied to identify the serial correlation of the error 
term. First differencing is conducted to eliminate the association level effects in order to obtain 
the valid moment conditions (Wawro, 2002). The first differencing can be developed from (1): 
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The time invariant dummies pw are removed after the differencing. But , 1i ty  is still 
correlated with ,i t since , 1i ty  in , 1i ty  is correlated with , 1i t  in ,i t . An instrumental variable 
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is needed to purge this correlation. In a dynamic panel model, the choice of instrumental variable 
is very important (Heckman and Vytlacil, 1998). Arellano and Bond (1991) showed the 
transformed residual in (4.2) has zero covariance between ,i ty and ,i tX in 2t  and earlier periods 
if the error term is assumed to have zero mean and is not serially correlated. Therefore if 
,( ) 0i tE   and , ,( ) 0i t i sE    , then , ,[ ' ] 0i t i tE z    
for Tt ,......,3 where 
, , 2 , 3,......, ,1; , 2 , 3,......, ,1;( , , )'i t i t i t i i t i t iz y y y X X X    denotes the possible instrument variable set.  
For the differenced equation system in (4.2), it can be written in a stacked form:  
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The set of instruments is given by the block diagonal matrix 
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Using the notation from the stacked equation (4.3), the vector of the population moment 
is  
[ ' ] 0i iE Z U    
        (4.4) 
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The sample analogue used to construct an optimal GMM estimator for ( , )   is 
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(4.5) is expressed as 0)(
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The optimal GMM estimator is given by 
1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ' ' ) ' 'X ZV Z X X ZV Z y    . 
where Vˆ is a consistent estimate of V , the limiting variance of the sample moments 
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In general the optimal choice for Vˆ is  
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where Uˆ is an estimate of the vector of residuals ,i t  . The two steps are estimating Uˆ  first and 
then estimating ˆ . 
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4.3 Primary Results of the Two Panel Models 
A random-effects Tobit panel model with dummy variables and a dynamic Tobit panel 
model are separately estimated in STATA11 with the command xttobit. The former model 
evaluates the effects of the regional dummies and the association‟s type dummies. The later 
model evaluates the effect of the lagged patronage refunds. It is impossible to combine both 
dummy variables and lagged variables in one Tobit panel model because the dummy variables 
are time invariant. The first differencing technique in the dynamic Tobit model will remove the 
time invariant variables‟ effect.  
Since some of the regions do have significant influence on the patronage refunds, the 
whether-or-not-to-pay decision in the previous chapter, it is important to analyze how it can 
affect the how-much-to-pay decision. From the tests on the 230 observations in Section 4.1, a 
possible serial correlation may exist, and the patronage refunds‟ persistence should be 
investigated as well. 
Descriptive information such as scatter plots in Figure 4.2 are generated to check the 
correlations and the distributions of the variables. The scatter plot provides the information about 
the relationship between the dependent variable and an explanatory variable on strength, shape, 
direction and any presence of outliers. The scatter plots in figure 4.2 suggest that there is no 
multicollinearity problem since predictors do not appear to be highly correlated.  
Table 4.5 gives the Pearson‟s correlation coefficients between the variables, and there are 
no highly correlated variables. However, some outliers can be detected from the scatter plots, 
especially in the cash versus tax plot. Further analysis finds that one observation can be removed 
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since it is generated incorrectly from the merger. The linear relationships between cash (the 
variable name for patronage refunds used in my STATA program) and the explanatory variables 
are not evident. 
4.3.1 Random-Effects Panel Tobit model 
A random-effects panel Tobit model is specified as: 
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Table 4.6 summarizes the regression basics. There are 1173 observations used in the 
regression, and 414 of them are censored at zero. Uncensored observations are 759. In other 
words, there are 759 positive cash patronage observations. Total number of sections is 300, i.e., 
there are 300 completely different identified associations in my data set. The minimum number 
of observations within one section (one association) is only a year. The maximum number of 
observations within one section is 10 years. The average number of observations within one 
section is about 4 years. The log likelihood will be discussed later with the model fitness. 
Table 4.7 provides the estimates of the random-effects panel Tobit on the coefficients, the 
standard error, the z-scores, the probability of z-scores, and the 95% confidence interval of the 
coefficient.  
Equity/Asset ratio (EA), credit risk rate (credit) and interest margin (interest) are the three 
significant explanatory variables in the decision of how much cash patronage refund is 
distributed. An association with a higher equity assets ratio will distribute a smaller amount of 
patronage refunds in cash. An association with a higher credit risk (or default risk) will also 
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distribute less money in patronage refunds. An association with a higher interest margin will 
return more patronage cash refunds. All five regional dummies are significant, which suggests 
significant diversity on patronage refunds across the FCS bank districts. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients directly display the changing relationship between variables, but the 
magnitudes of estimated coefficients need further analysis. 
Interpreting estimated coefficients from the Tobit model is more complex than 
interpreting coefficients from the OLS model. As Sigelman and Zeng (1999) point out there are 
three expected values on the dependent variable.  
1. The expected value of the latent variable is defined as XyE )( * .  
2. The expected value of the dependent variable given the dependent variable is positive 
is defined as
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Accordingly, there are three possible marginal effects. In the Tobit model the marginal 
effects are the derivative
idx
dy
 of the regression function with respect to ix .   
1. Marginal effect on the latent dependent variable is defined as i
ix
yE


 )( *
. It 
indicates how a one unit change in an independent variable alters the latent dependent 
variable. It equals the estimated coefficients in Table 4.7. 
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2. Marginal effect on the expected value for uncensored dependent variable is defined 
as )]
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change in an independent variable affects the uncensored dependent variable.  
3. Marginal effect on the expected value for both censored and uncensored dependent 
variable is defined as i
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. Note that )/( X is simply the 
estimated probability of observing an uncensored observation at these values of X . 
Table 4.8 summarizes all three types of marginal effects 
idx
dy
with respect to the 
significant explanatory variables only. The column “VAR” lists the significant explanatory 
variables and the column “X” gives the means of the explanatory variables. The first marginal 
effect is
ix
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. The second marginal effect is
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Which marginal effect should be used to analyze the regression results depends on the 
research purpose. As Wooldridge (2001) suggested, if the data is always censored, then focusing 
on the latent variable is not particularly useful. In our case, the latent variable 
*cash  is not 
observable for the negative values, and it is not meaningful to generate negative estimated 
patronage refunds for any policy recommendation. In contrast, the marginal effect of x  on the 
observed variable y , i.e., the expected value of y conditional on y being greater than 
zero
ix
cashcashE

 )0|(
 is the most useful marginal effect. Therefore the marginal effects on the 
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expected value of patronage refunds conditional on positive amount can be interpreted as the 
following. 
If the EA ratio increases by 0.01 then the cash patronage refund will decrease by 161 
thousand dollars. In other words, EA ratio increases from 0.19 to 0.2, then patronage refund will 
drop from 6067 thousand dollars to 5906 thousand dollars. 
 
If the credit risk rate increases by 0.01, then the cash patronage refund will decrease by 
247 thousand dollars. In other words, if credit risk rate increases from 0.01 to 0.02, then 
patronage refund will drop from 6067 thousand dollars to 5820 thousand dollars.  
If the interest margin increases by 0.01, then the cash patronage refund will increase by 
580 thousand dollars. In other words, if interest margin increases from 0.0276 to 0.0376, then 
patronage refund will grow from 6067 thousand dollars to 6647 thousand dollars.  
The marginal effects of the EA ratio, credit risk, and interest margin have significant 
influence on the patronage refund cash amount. When the associations build up the capital 
reserve with a higher equity level, or when the associations face a higher default risk, the 
associations tend to reduce the cash amount of patronage refunds. When the associations offer a 
lower interest rate on their loans, they are also likely to reduce the cash amount of patronage 
refunds.  
Besides the above three ratios, the five regional dummies are significant explanatory 
variables as well. The marginal effects indicate the discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 
1. Compared to the association who does not belong to any of the five picked regions
12
, being a 
CoBank district association can increase the cash patronage refund by 8444 thousand dollars, 
                                                 
12
 Refer to Table 2, there are associations coded as none of the five current regions before mergers. 
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which is the highest increment among the five districts. Being an AgFirst district association can 
increase the cash patronage refund by 4323 thousand dollars. A USAgbank association increases 
the cash patronage refund by 2901 thousand dollars. An AgriBank district association can 
increase the cash patronage refund by 1852 thousand dollars. A FCB Texas association can 
increase the cash patronage refund by 1378 thousand dollars. 
 
These estimates are consistent with the tendency showed in Figure 3.2 in the Chapter 
Three. The associations in different bank districts have clearly different cash patronage refunds. 
The associations in the CoBank and the AgFirst districts tend to pay more patronage refunds in 
cash than other districts.  
The log likelihood value in Table 4.6 is -7728.67, which is used in the Wald LR chi-
square test of whether all explanatory variables‟ coefficients are simultaneously zero. The null 
hypothesis is rejected so at least one of the explanatory variable coefficients is non zero. The last 
three rows of Table 4.7 shows the model‟s goodness of fit.
 u
 is the overall variance component 
and v  is the panel level variance component.   is calculated as the percentage contribution to 
the total variance of the panel level variance component.  
vu
v




 .  
When  is zero, the panel estimators are not different from the pooled OLS estimators. In 
Table 4.7  is estimated at 0.6967, which suggests a better goodness of fit of the random-effects 
panel Tobit model than in the pooled model.   
Since the Gauss-Hermite quadrature is the key used to approximate the high dimension 
integrals as part of the likelihood in the random-effects Tobit model, the sensitivity of the 
quadrature shall be tested. Quadrature is the most accepted approach to fit the random-effects 
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Tobit panel model. However, it can easily break down when the panel size is large, or the 
correlation within the panel is large, or the variables are near constants within the panel. In 
STATA, quadchk assumes different initial values for quadrature fitting points and compares the 
estimates. The comparison listed in Table 4.9 compare the STATA default quadrature of 25 
points with other two levels: 17 points and 33 points. The three estimates all get converged and 
are very close to each other. It shows that the estimation is robust and is not sensitive to the 
randomly chosen value of quadratures. 
4.3.2 Dynamic Panel Tobit Model with Lagged Patronage Refund 
The random-effects panel Tobit model includes dummy variables such as the region and 
the association type but it cannot include the lagged patronage refunds. Therefore the dynamic 
panel Tobit model is specified to test the state dependence between the current patronage refunds 
and the previous patronage refunds. In the dynamic panel Tobit, time invariant dummy variables 
are removed by the first differencing transformation. 
it
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utaxinterestcreditUREEAprofitlagprofitsize
cashcashcashE

 
87654321
1,
_             
)0|(


 
Since the lagged dependent variable is included, the implementation of instrumental 
variables is required to adjust for the heterogeneity of the dependent variable. Arellano and Bond, 
(1991) suggest the dependent variable and exogenous explanatory variables can be used as 
instrumental variables from 2t  and all previous years. I only have valid data over 9 years since 
the first year is missing after taking into account the differencing between years.  I limit the 
number of instruments to 4 years ago ( 2, 3, 4t t t   ) in order to prevent the over-identifying 
problem. I selected two exogenous variables: operating expense and capital stock. These two 
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variables are not related with the error term on the estimation of patronage refunds since capital 
stock depends on the number of members of the associations and operating expense is the cost 
related with operations but not with capital management.  
First differencing also reduces the number of observations used in the regression. The 
model utilizes 874 observations and has 217 different identified associations. There are 255 
associations with zero patronage and 619 associations with positive patronage. The minimum 
number of observations within one association is one year and the maximum number of 
observations within one association is nine years. 
When compared with the random-effects model with dummies, the dynamic model 
returns quite similar results (Table 4.10). The overall variance component does not change much 
compared to the random-effects Tobit panel. However the panel level variance component is 
much smaller because of the first differencing. The percentage contribution  gets small too 
(0.1118). The dynamic panel Tobit estimation is significantly different from the pooled OLS 
since   is not close to zero. The Wald Likelihood Ratio test shows that the hypothesis of which 
all predictors‟ coefficients are equal to zero is rejected13.  
Credit risk rate and interest margin are still significant. Size and tax are still insignificant. 
Lagged patronage refunds, URE ratio, and profit become significant in the dynamic panel Tobit. 
Equity/Asset ratio becomes insignificant at a 5% significance level, but stays significant at a 
10% significance level. Since the first differencing removes the section invariant variables such 
as region dummy and association type dummy, this model could not explain the effects from the 
different districts and association types. 
                                                 
13
 Log likelihood equals -2770.9664 and the probability of chi in Wald test equals 0.000. 
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An association with a high credit risk will refund in a lesser amount of patronage refunds. 
An association with a low interest margin will refund fewer patronage refunds. The amount of 
patronage refunds do not depend on the size of the association, or the tax burden of the 
association. An association with a high profit level tends to pay more in patronage refunds while 
an association with a high unallocated retained earnings ratio tends to pay less in patronage 
refunds.   
The previous patronage refund amount has a positive influence on current patronage 
refunds, which provides evidence of the patronage refunds persistence over time. An association 
who pays more patronage refunds than others is likely to continue paying more. In order to 
illustrate the quantitative relationship between the observed patronage refunds and the 
explanatory variables, the three types of marginal effects are listed in Table 4.11. 
The interpretation of the marginal effects follows the previous section. If the EA ratio 
increases 0.01 unit from 0.19 to 0.2, then patronage refund will drop from 4321 thousand dollars 
to 4285 thousand dollars. If the credit risk rate increases 0.01 unit from 0.0088 to 0.0188, then 
patronage refund will drop from 4321 thousand dollars to 4058 thousand dollars. If the interest 
margin increases 0.01 unit from 0.0276 to 0.0376, then patronage refund will grow from 4321 
thousand dollars to 4777 thousand dollars. If the URE ratio increases 0.01 unit from 0.8692 to 
0.8792, then patronage refund will drop from 4321 thousand dollars to 4191 thousand dollars.  
If one association‟s last year patronage refunds is one dollar more than another 
association, this association‟s current patronage refunds is estimated to be 56 cents higher than 
the other association. Therefore it is evident that an association that pays large patronage refunds 
tends to keep paying large patronage refunds.  
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Profit becomes significant in the dynamic panel Tobit model. If profit increases 0.01 unit 
from 0.0177 to 0.0277, then patronage refund will grow from 4321 thousand dollars to 4779 
thousand dollars. The marginal effect of profit is quite strong in the dynamic panel Tobit. This is 
a similar conclusion to the life cycle theory stated in the corporate finance. Companies with 
higher profitability and faster growth rate normally distribute higher level of dividends to the 
shareholders (Fama and French, 2001;Dickens et al., 2002;DeAngelo et al., 2006).   
The same quadrature sensitivity test is conducted for the dynamic panel Tobit as well as 
for the random-effects model. The estimates from different quadrature points are close; therefore 
the estimates of the dynamic panel Tobit are robust. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The FCS associations are different from each other on many observable characteristics, 
such as size, interest margin, credit risk exposure, region, association type, capital structure ratio, 
and tax burden. My regression analysis suggests that some of the characteristics significantly 
affect the patronage refund amount decision.  Two types of models, random-effects panel Tobit 
and dynamic panel Tobit are fitted with the FCS association data.   
With a random-effects Tobit model, the diversity of patronage refunds across five FCS 
bank districts is feasibly investigated. With a dynamic Tobit model, it is possible to correct the 
unobserved heterogeneity of the association characteristics on the patronage refunds practice. 
Both models show that the capital ratio, the credit risk and the interest margin are the most 
important factors that help decide the amount of the distributed patronage refunds. In general, an 
association with a high capital reserve, such as a high URE ratio or a high EA ratio distributes 
less patronage in cash. Offering a low interest rate on loans, and therefore a low interest margin, 
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does seem to trigger paying less in patronage refunds. These relationships are important when 
simulating the capital structure changes in the next chapter. The credit risk and the capital impact 
are supportive of each other. With a high credit risk (a higher proportion of bad loans), 
associations normally hold the patronage refunds and keep more earnings. Therefore the 
association can build up the capital structure. On the other hand, when associations keep an 
unallocated high volume of equity, they build up the capital reserve and certainly lower the 
available funds to be distributed as patronage refunds. 
In the Logit model in Chapter Three, profit is not a significant factor in the decision of 
whether or not to pay patronage refunds. In the dynamic panel Tobit model in Chapter Four, 
profit becomes significant in the decision of how much patronage is distributed.  Size is 
important in paying or not paying in Chapter Three however is not important in the decision on 
the amount of patronage refunds. Therefore associations do consider differently when they 
decide on whether or not to pay patronage refund and when they decide the amount paid out.  
On the other hand, the capital ratios (EA and URE), interest margin, and bank districts 
play an important role in both patronage refunds decisions. In Chapter Four, the regression 
shows that the associations in CoBank and AgFirst districts distribute a higher amount of 
patronage cash refunds than the associations in US Agbank, AgriBank and FCB Texas districts. 
In Chapter Three, being an association in USAgBank, AgFirst, FCB Texas districts are 
significant in the decision of „to pay or not to pay‟ (CoBank was not included in Logit model). 
Compared to the region characteristics, the association types are not important factors in the 
patronage refunds decisions. 
The evidence of dependence or persistence in patronage refunds policies is found in my 
regression results. Previous patronage refund amounts do positively affect the current patronage 
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refunds amount. Normally associations are considered reluctant to stop patronage refunds paying 
since that could be viewed as negative signs of financial performance.   
It is interesting to compare the important factors that affect the payment of patronage 
refunds in the previous chapter. Size is important for an association to decide whether or not to 
pay patronage refunds but not important in deciding how much to pay. On the other hand credit 
risk is important when an association considers the patronage refund amount but not important in 
the whether-or-not-to-pay decision. It seems like the capital structure, such as EA and URE, and 
the interest margin are both significant factors in the patronage refunds. They influence the 
paying decision as well as the how much decision. Therefore in the simulation model proposed 
in Chapter Five, capital structure, interest margin are important aspects to be included. 
A forward looking analysis is often of more use to policymakers and stakeholders since 
market environments can change very rapidly. A simulation model is the appropriate analytical 
tool to perform forward-looking scenario analyses. We can address assumptions on risk 
distributions and other stochastic parameters in a simulation model that we cannot learn from an 
estimated model on historical data. The empirical results of this paper will provide some a priori 
knowledge about market structure, which will be incorporated into the simulation model. Interest 
margin is an important factor too. Therefore in the capital structure simulation, the interest 
margin uncertainty should be included instead of assuming a fixed value.  Then we will use some 
relevant scenarios to explore the interdependence of capital structures and the stochastic features 
of risk exposure based on the relationship identified in the first two papers.  
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Tables 
Table 4.1: FCS Association‟s Patronage Refunds Persistence 
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Missing  195 42 30 32 3 1 3 0 4 3 
Keep the same 0 97 88 84 81 84 86 89 86 79 
Start to pay 0 6 8 1 11 11 6 5 1 1 
Stop to pay 0 6 10 12 3 0 4 1 6 8 
 Total observations 
 = 1187 
195 151 136 129 98 96 99 95 97 91 
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Table 4.2: The Paid_rate and the Number of Associations in Each Bank Region  
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
9 Wichita 
# of associations 
0.32 
16 
 
0.27 
15 
0.37 
12 
0.57 
4 
      
10 FCB Texas 
# of associations 
0.30 
14 
0.24 
11 
0.25 
13 
1.23 
12 
0.18 
12 
0.36 
17 
0.40 
21 
0.57 
20 
0.34 
20 
0.39 
12 
11 Western 
# of associations 
2.14 
1 
0.26 
4 
0.14 
4 
0.27 
1 
      
17 Agribank(old) 
# of associations 
0.44 
10 
0.44 
12 
0.31 
7 
0.70 
24 
      
18 AgAmerica 
# of associations 
0.16 
1 
0.20 
1 
0.00 
1 
0.36 
6 
      
20 AgFirst(old) 
# of associations 
1.25 
35 
0.71 
23 
0.74 
24 
0.29 
5 
0.37 
23 
0.59 
23 
0.63 
23 
0.60 
23 
0.80 
22 
0.45 
19 
21CoBank(old) 
# of associations 
0.26 
4 
0.19 
4 
0.26 
3 
       
22 Agribank 
# of associations 
  0.25 
6 
 0.20 
8 
0.33 
10 
0.27 
12 
0.31 
13 
0.25 
13 
0.19 
12 
23 CoBank 
# of associations 
  0.58 
5 
 0.21 
5 
0.43 
5 
0.41 
5 
0.36 
5 
0.39 
5 
0.39 
5 
24 U.S. Agbank 
# of associations 
   0.28 
15 
0.19 
19 
0.45 
23 
0.32 
22 
0.32 
24 
0.59 
22 
0.37 
21 
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Table 4.3: Explanatory Variables and the Mean Value (in percentage except size) 
Variable Mean value Definition 
size= 12.78 logarithm of accrual loans and nonaccrual loans 
profit= 1.72 net income over total assets, ROA 
lag_profit= 1.72 ROA in previous year 
EA= 19.02 net worth over total assets 
URE= 87.37 unallocated retained earnings over earned surplus 
credit= 0.88 nonaccrual loans over total loans 
interest = 2.76 interest income minus interest expense over accrual loans 
tax= 5.64 tax over the net income before tax after but after interest cost 
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Table 4.4: Test Results with Balanced Subset Panel Data 
Tests Statistics  Prob  Outcomes 
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(1) 162.63 Prob > chi2 0.0000 OLS rejected 
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation 
F(1,22) 13.396 Prob > F 0.0014 Serial correlation 
 
Pesaran's test of cross 
section dependence 
 
   
1.029 
 
Prob= 
 
0.3036 
 
No dependence 
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Table 4.5: Correlation Coefficients between the Variables 
  size profit lag_profit ea URE credit interest tax 
cash 0.51* 0.2* 0.17* -0.14* -0.26* -0.04 0.04 -0.1* 
size   0.15* 0.1* -0.5* -0.08* -0.02 -0.31* -0.2* 
profit     0.57* 0.26* -0.06* -0.3* 0.35* -0.19* 
lag_profit    0.2* -0.09* -0.17* 0.14* -0.11* 
ea        0.2* -0.01 0.24* 0.02 
URE          -0.12* -0.14* 0.06 
credit            0.02 0.046 
interest              0.12* 
 
Note: at 5% significance level, the correlation coefficients with * are significant. 
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Table 4.6: Random Effect Tobit Panel Estimation Statistics 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian Group variable: association 
Number of observations 1173 
Left-censored 414 
Uncensored 759 
Right-censored 0 
Number of groups 300 
Observations per group: minimum 1 
                                        average 3.9 
                                        maximum 10 
Log likelihood  = -7728.6657   
Wald chi2(15) 184.62 
Probability > chi2 0.0000 
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Table 4.7: Estimate Results of Random-Effects Panel Tobit with Dummies 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Confidence Interval] 
size 14.30467 155.4107 0.09 0.927 -290.295 318.904 
profit 28353.85 25541.1 1.11 0.267 -21705.8 78413.49 
lag_profit -1255.87 20448.2 -0.06 0.951 -41333.6 38821.86 
URE -957.199 1296.123 -0.74 0.46 -3497.55 1583.157 
EA -40056.9* 6227.578 -6.43 0.000 -52262.7 -27851.1 
credit -61377.3* 16616.29 -3.69 0.000 -93944.7 -28810 
interest 144421.8* 28904.59 5 0.000 87769.87 201073.8 
tax -591.996 705.6192 -0.84 0.401 -1974.98 790.9923 
dist2-FCB Texas 3157.74* 1191.289 2.65 0.008 822.857 5492.624 
dist6-AgFirst 8670.406* 1392.42 6.23 0.000 5941.313 11399.5 
dist8-AgriBank 4047.994* 1697.229 2.39 0.017 721.4872 7374.502 
dist9-CoBank 13193.79* 2844.606 4.64 0.000 7618.463 18769.11 
dist10-USAgBank 6100.551* 1361.762 4.48 0.000 3431.546 8769.556 
ACA 1220.259 1493.338 0.82 0.414 -1706.63 4147.148 
FLCA -539.677 1538.024 -0.35 0.726 -3554.15 2474.795 
sigma_v 5873.625 373.185 15.74 0.000 5142.196 6605.054 
sigma_u 3875.336 111.4223 34.78 0.000 3656.953 4093.72 
rho 0.69671 0.029348   0.636956 0.751617 
Note: at the 5% significance level, the coefficients with* are significant. 
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Table 4.8: Marginal Effects of Random-Effects Tobit Panel with Dummies 
VAR X E(cash*)=1185.093 E(cash| cash>0)=6067.65 E(cash)=3439.57 
EA ratio 0.1902 -40056.9 -16091.46 -22707.07 
Credit risk 0.0088 -61377.32 -24656.18 -34792.98 
Interest margin 0.0276 144421.8 58016.4 81868.44 
dist2-FCB Texas 0.1909 3157.74 1378.46 1956.66 
dist6-AgFirst 0.2088 8670.41 4323.34 5982.12 
dist8-Agribank 0.1202 4047.99 1851.82 2625.65 
dist9-Cobank 0.0341 13193.79 8444.16 10801.88 
dist10-USagbank 0.1756 6100.55 2900.77 4078.62 
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Table 4.9: Quadrature Sensitivity Tests (25 points, 17 points, and 33 points) 
  25 points 17 points 33 points  25 points 17 points 33 points 
cash -40056.9 -40056.904 -40056.915 cash 3157.74 3157.75 3157.75 
EA Diff. -0.0004 -0.0112 dist2 Diff. 0.0003 0.0018 
  Relative diff. 0.000 0.000   Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
cash -61377.319 -61377.32 -61377.339 cash 8670.406 8670.406 8670.41 
Credit Diff. -0.0006 -0.0196 dist6 Diff. 0.0003 0.0025 
  Relative diff. 0.000 0.000   Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
cash 144421.82 144421.82 144421.87 cash 4047.99 4047.99 4047.99 
interest Diff. 0.0027 0.0525 dist8 Diff. 0.0002 0.0007 
  Relative diff. 0.000 0.000   Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
sigma_v: 5873.62 5873.8 5873.63 cash 13193.787 13193.788 13193.79 
_cons Diff. 0.0001 0.0021 dist9 Diff. 0.0004 0.0029 
  Relative diff. 0.000 0.000   Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
sigma_u: 3875.34 3875.33 3875.34 cash 6100.551 6100.55 6100.553 
_cons Diff. 0.000 0.001 dist10 Diff. 0.0002 0.0025 
  Relative diff. 0.000 0.000   Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
       Log  likelihood -7728.6657 -7728.6657 -7728.6657 
          Diff. 0.000 0.000 
          Relative diff. 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4.10: Parameter Estimates of Dynamic Tobit Panel Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Confidence Interval] 
lag_cash 0.964758* 0.022312 43.24 0.000 0.921027 1.00849 
Size -92.3393 66.49512 -1.39 0.165 -222.667 37.98876 
profit 79022.82* 21603.26 3.66 0.000 36681.22 121364.4 
lag_profit 16806.84 19298.24 0.87 0.384 -21017 54630.7 
URE -2235.69* 771.5025 -2.9 0.004 -3747.81 -723.571 
EA -6278.61** 3561.623 -1.76 0.078 -13259.3 702.0402 
credit -45357* 14058.88 -3.23 0.001 -72911.9 -17802.1 
interest 78703.2* 24399.66 3.23 0.001 30880.75 126525.6 
tax -224.001 602.1389 -0.37 0.71 -1404.17 956.1695 
sigma_v 385.276 445.953 14.7 0.000 4277.852 5594.7 
sigma_u 3648.878 104.921 34.78 0.000 3443.237 3854.52 
rho 0.1118 0.0258   0.0971 0.1256 
Note: *indicates 5% significance level. **indicates 10% significance level. 
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Table 4.11: Marginal Effects of Dynamic Panel Tobit Model 
VAR X E(cash*)=3025.491 E(cash| cash>0)=4321.47 E(cash)=3442.02 
Lagged cash 3934.85 0.9648 0.5589 0.7684 
Profit 0.0177 79022.82 45782.53 62941.05 
URE 0.8692 -2235.69 -1295.26 -1780.71 
EA 0.1785 -6278.61 -3637.57 -5000.87 
Credit risk 0.0086 -45357.01 -26277.96 -36126.5 
Interest margin 0.0279 78703.2 45597.36 62686.47 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1: Exploring a Balanced Subset of the Data 
 
Note: Cash represents the patronage refunds for each association and Cash_mean1 represents the average 
patronage refunds for each year. 
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Figure 4.2: Scatter Plots of the Patronage Refunds and the Explanatory Variables 
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CHAPTER 5 
A DYNAMIC SIMULATION ON THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF A FCS 
ASSOCIATION  
Capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity to finance a firm. One of the most 
important decisions in corporate finance is how a firm chooses its capital structure. The 
relationship between capital structure and a firm‟s fundamental value has been a long time focus 
of attention and a subject of considerable debates by academic and financial institutions. The 
debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure and if so how to find it.  
Issuing stocks to ordinary investors, which is a common channel of external equity 
financing for banks and other corporate firms, is not an option for FCS associations. Moreover, 
FCS association borrows directly from its regional bank and the debt amount largely depends on 
the loans amount. Therefore debt financing is also a limited managerial decision at FCS 
association‟s level. FCS association‟s capital financing management is confined to internal 
financing: how much earnings are retained and how much are distributed as patronage refunds. 
Other capital management includes size of new lending, and interest rate charged on loans. They 
relate closely to patronage refunds and altogether determine the FCS association‟s capital 
structure.  
If an association has less loan loss, or low operating cost, or high net interest income, in 
brief a good year in business, the manager usually faces the following choices: distributing more 
patronage refunds, or lending more loans, or building up capital level. These managerial actions 
are not exclusive and they are interactive with each other, thus affect the capital structure for the 
next decision period. Therefore a multiple regression model is not good enough to capture all 
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these simultaneous relationships. A simulation model focusing on the interdependence among 
these managerial actions in a dynamic term is more appropriate.  
In the Chapter Three and the Chapter Four, the focus is patronage refunds, which has 
important influence on equity level therefore on capital structure. In this chapter, I put patronage 
refunds back to the whole picture of capital structure management. With a dynamic simulation 
model, patronage refunds is incorporated into the system and allowed to interact with other 
capital management decision variables.  
The objective of this paper is threefold: investigate how the capital structure of a FCS 
association evolves over time under certain financial conditions; capture the interdependence 
among capital management decisions such as patronage refunds, interest rate charged on loans 
and new lending amount; and incorporate significant factors that were detected in the empirical 
models from previous chapters into the simulation model and check whether the simulation 
outcomes are consistent with the empirical findings.  
This paper utilizes the System Dynamics method to replicate the capital structure of FCS 
association and to analyze the interdependence among three important capital managerial 
decisions: the loans growth, the patronage refunds, and the interest rate charged on loans. The 
method allows stochastic parameters to be introduced into the dynamic simulation.  
System Dynamics is an approach to framing, understanding and simulating the behavior 
of a complex system over time. It captures the feedback loops, the stocks and the flows, the time 
delays, and most importantly the nonlinearity among variables. The interactions among variables 
can affect the whole system just as importantly as individual component.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a brief 
introduction on capital structure and capital ratio. Section 5.2 introduces the capital structure of 
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FCS associations. Section 5.3 describes the simulation model used to analyze the capital 
structure. Section 5.4 explains all the simulation results. Section 5 is the conclusion. The 
software used for the System Dynamic modeling is iSEE STELLA 9.0.2. 
5.1 Capital Structure and Capital Ratio 
5.1.1 Capital Structure Theory Overview and FCS’s Optimal Capital Structure 
The masterpiece in capital structure theory is the Modigliani and Miller Theorem 
(Modigliani and Merton, 1958). They demonstrate that a firm‟s value is irrelevant to its capital 
structure under the frictionless market assumption.
14
 It implies that a firm with only equity 
capital has the same fundamental value as a firm with both equity and debt, as long as they 
generate the same amount of perpetual cash flows to their investors. In reality, the frictionless 
market assumption is violated and must be corrected. 
The corporate tax is added as the first correction of the imperfection (Modigliani and 
Merton, 1963). Because the interest expense is tax-free, the firm with high debt leverage takes 
the advantage of tax shield therefore has higher value than the firm with low debt leverage. It 
suggests that the optimal capital structure occurs with 100% debt financing. This strong 
conclusion leads to the second correction of imperfection: the bankruptcy cost.  
High debt level increases the bankruptcy likelihood and lowers firm‟s stock price, 
therefore borrowing debt is not always good. The tradeoff between the tax advantage of debt and 
bankruptcy cost associated with debt results in an optimal capital structure, the so called balancing 
theorem (Baxter, 1967).  
                                                 
14
 Frictionless market assumption includes perfect competition, homogeneous expectation, perpetual cash flows, 
public information, and no transaction cost.   
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Miller (Merton, 1977) adds the third correction: personal taxes to demonstrate that optimal 
capital structure occurs on a macro-level, but not on the firm-level. Interest tax shield at the firm 
level is offset at the investor level. Besides the above fundamentals of capital structure theory, 
there are other important extensions such as agency cost, asymmetric information, and 
incomplete contracts (See Masulis, 1983, Milton and Raviv, 1991 for a thorough review). In 
conclusion, there is no proved existence of optimal capital structure at the firm level under 
realistic market scenario. 
Theoretically the optimal capital structure occurs at where the firm‟s value is maximized 
while empirically it is very hard to define such capital structure at the firm level. Some 
researchers assume that the optimal capital structure occurs at the point where the marginal rate 
of return on equity is equal to the marginal rate of interest on debt (VanSickle and Ladd, 1983). 
However FCS association‟s cooperative characteristics make it even harder to define such kind 
of optimal structure.  
First of all, as I have said, cooperative‟s equity financing is limited. FCS associations do 
not issue public traded stocks so the external channel of equity financing is not available. FCS 
associations can only use retained earnings as the internal channel of equity financing. Second of 
all, there is no market value based measure for a share of equity in cooperatives. The debt 
capital‟s market value can be somehow estimated by the interest expense paid to FCS banks. 
However the equity capital is not tradable. It is held and will be retired to cooperative members 
at par value. It neither appreciates nor depreciates therefore there is no market value related. 
These cooperative features directly lead to the fact that the associations‟ managers may 
underestimate the cost of equity and follow the practice of maximizing the use of internal equity 
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but minimizing the use of debt. Therefore this paper places emphasis on the capital structure 
changing instead of the optimal capital structure finding.  
5.1.2 Definition of Capital Ratio and Regulations on Capital Ratio 
Capital ratio is a common measurement of the capital structure. Despite the several 
standards of calculating capital ratio, it is generally defined as the ratio of equity value over the 
assets value or risk-adjusted assets value. In the Chapter Three and the Chapter Four, I used the 
EA ratio to refer the capital ratio. Since capital ratio is an indicator of the financial stability, it 
must satisfy certain regulatory minimum. Normally high capital ratio indicates safe financial 
operation.  
Regulators require financial lending institutions to maintain „appropriate‟ minimum 
capital level for safe and sound consideration. In the United States, the first explicit regulatory 
requirements were implemented in 1981. A 5.5% minimum ratio of „primary capital‟15 and a 6% 
minimum ratio of „total capital‟16 were required (VanHoose, 2007). Banks with less than 3% 
primary capital ratio were declared as unsafe and were asked to comply with applicable 
enforcements such as receivership within 90 days.  
A new risk-based capital requirements framework was developed by the central bank 
governors in G-10 countries and was adopted as the Basel Capital Accord since 1988. The Basel 
Accord
17
 takes into account the heterogeneities of risks across assets, and proposes risk-weighted 
                                                 
15
 Primary capital includes common and perpetual preferred stocks, surplus, undistributed profit, and capital 
reserves. 
16
 Total capital includes primary capital and subordinated notes, debentures, other preferred stock, and mandatory 
convertible debt. 
17
 The Basel Accords refer to the banking supervision Accords issued by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. Basel I and Basel II are issued. Basel III is under development.  
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regulatory capital requirements. For example, 0% risk category includes cash, gold and claims 
unconditionally guaranteed by central governments. 20% risk category includes securities and 
50% risk category includes loans. Clearly loans are considered as high risk assets. Regulators use 
the Tier 1 capital ratio
18
 to separate banks into different risk categories. A bank with a Tier 1 
capital ratio of at least 4% is considered as adequately capitalized. A bank with a Tier 1 capital 
ratio of at least 6% is considered as well capitalized. The majority of banks, especially big banks, 
keep their capital ratios above the minimum level.  
5.2 Capital Structure of FCS Associations 
As for the FCS, Farm Credit Administration (FCA) requires that each institution shall at 
all times maintain permanent capital ratio at a level of at least 7% of its risk-adjusted asset base. 
Besides the permanent capital ratio, two other ratios are also computed for the regulatory 
purposes. Total surplus ratio has a required minimum of 7%. Core surplus ratio has a required 
minimum of 3.5%.
19
  In practice all FCS associations have been always keeping a much higher 
capital ratio than the minimum level since year 2000 (Figure 5.1).  
As of December 2009, the permanent capital ratio ranged from 15.3% to 18.4% for FCS 
banks and 9.1% to 27.6% for FCS associations, which almost double the regulatory minimum. 
The general concern of falling below regulatory capital requirement among commercial banks 
and their regulators is not a worry to FCS associations and FCA.  
                                                 
18
 The Tier 1 capital is the core measure of bank‟s financial strength from a regulator‟s point of view. It includes 
common stock and retained earnings. 
19
 The permanent capital ratio is average at risk capital divided by average risk adjusted assets. The total surplus 
ratio is average unallocated surplus less any deductions made in the computation of permanent capital divided by 
average risk adjusted assets. The core surplus ratio is the average unallocated surplus less the association‟s 
investment in the regional bank divided by average risk adjusted assets. 
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Why do the associations keep such high level of capital? First, unlike the commercial 
banks can mix the portfolio between loans and securities, the association‟ assets investments are 
limited to agricultural loans. Second, this high capital ratio trend can be traced back to the 1980s 
agricultural crisis. During the crisis agricultural lending institutions‟ capital was eroded and 
government assisted the FCS with federal funds. Therefore restoring the capital and repaying 
federal fund were the major goals. Third, the recession and volatility in commodity markets in 
recent years increased the risk on agricultural lenders. Nonperforming Loans/Gross Loans ratio 
increased drastically from 0.43% in 2007, to 1.5% in 2008, and to 2.14% in 2009.  Net charge-
offs increased from $99 million in 2008 to $518 million in 2009. A high capital reserve can 
provide an important buffer for a safe and sound operation for the agricultural lenders.  
5.3 A Capital Structure Simulation Model 
A recursive model to simulate relationships between balance sheet variables for FCS 
association is developed by Sherrick and Barry (2006) in Excel. Their sketch model assumes 
initial values of assets and equity. Parameters such as tax rate, interest rate paid on debt, 
operating cost, loan loss ratio, are assumed to take fixed values. Loans growth rate, loan interest 
rate, and patronage refunds rate are the three derived variables. At any given level of target 
capital ratio, loans growth rate, loan interest rate, and patronage refunds rate are interdependent. 
With any two of them fixed, the association manager can decide on the third one. The 
quantitative relationships among the three variable rates are certain. Sherrick and Barry‟s model 
can be projected into multiple periods as financial planning. However, the parameters take fixed 
values and the model cannot capture the uncertainties such as interest rate risk and credit risk. 
My paper extends their model into a comprehensive and dynamic frame.  
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In Van den Heuvel‟s bank equity paper (Van den Heuvel, 2005), he pointed out that bank 
equity affects the loan supply and the rate charged. He concluded that a bank‟s optimal lending 
policy is to keep capital ratio exactly at the regulatory minimum if the bank can raise new equity 
at no cost. On the contrary, if a bank cannot issue equity costless yet still attempts to keep its 
lending equal to its unconstrained case, it has to hold a high buffer of capital through retained 
earnings. This provides a solid theoretical reasoning for why FCS associations keep high capital 
ratios.  
This paper is inspired by Sherrick and Barry‟s model and is based on Van den Heuvel‟s 
method to replicate the capital structure of a representative FCS association. The association 
faces three major decisions: how many new loans to make, how much patronage refunds to 
distribute, and what interest rate to levy on loans issued. The simulation model analyzes the FCS 
association‟s capital management with variant parameters dynamically. The uncertain parameters 
include the loans repayment rate, the loans charge-off rate (expected loan default risk), the 
interest rates paid to FCS banks, and the tax rate. Patronage refunds rate, new loan growth rate, 
interest rate charged on loans are the decision variables. 
5.3.1 Assumptions and Specifications 
The FCS association‟s balance sheet at time zero is given as follows. Loans tL are the 
only assets and securities are assumed to be zero. Loans are financed by debt tB and equity 
capital tE . To be more specific, tB  is the funds borrowed from FCS banks and tE is the 
accumulated retained earnings. The relationship ttt EBL   must hold. In the first period, the 
association decides on making new loans tN  and distributing patronage refunds tP . 
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Assets 
 
Liabilities 
  
Loans 
 
Lt 
Debt Bt 
Equity Et 
Assume the average maturity of the loans portfolio of this association is constant and a 
fraction  of the outstanding loans portfolio is due at each period. So 

1
represents the loans 
portfolio‟s average maturity. For example, %10 means that each year 10% of the outstanding 
loans is due so the loans portfolio‟s average maturity is 10 years. The actual  in each period can 
be larger than 10% or smaller than 10%. It indicates that the real repayment of loans can be paid 
off early or be delayed. Loans are risky assets so a charge-off rate  is used to indicate the 
proportion of loan defaulted. Here the new loan is assumed to follow the same repayment rate 
and has the same default risk as the outstanding loans. Furthermore, the repayment and the 
charge-off on new loan begin immediately. Therefore at the end of the first period, the 
outstanding loan value for the next period equals: 
)1)((1 ttttt NLL            (5.1) 
The equity capital for the next period is changed by two capital flows: the patronage 
refunds Pt is the outflow, and the net income t  is the inflow. Net income is defined as: 
)())(1( tttttttttt NLBrNL   ,       (5.2) 
where t is the interest rate charged on the average loan portfolio, tr is the interest rate paid to 
FCS regional bank who lends money to the association. Therefore 
tttttt BrNL  ))(1(  represents the net interest income. )( ttt NL  is the net charge-off on 
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bad loans. If the tax rate is defined as t , then the equity capital at the end of the first period 
equals: 
)1(1 ttttt PEE            (5.3) 
The balance sheet at the end of the period looks like below.   
Assets 
 
Liabilities 
 
 
Loans 
 
Lt+1 
Debt Bt+1 
Equity Et+1 
For completeness, the relationship 111   ttt EBL must hold. Therefore the following 
equation holds too. 
)]1([)1)((111 ttttttttttt PENLELB        (5.4) 
The regulatory capital ratio  must be satisfied at each time period, therefore 
t
t
L
E
. If 
the capital ratio ever falls below the regulatory minimum, the association is prohibited to either 
issue new loans or to return patronage refunds. Net income should be retained completely to 
restore the equity capital. It means if 
t
t
L
E
, then 0,0  tt PN . In fact, this restriction holds for 
all periods.
 
 




nt
nt
t
t
L
E
L
E
,...,
1
1 . It creates limits on new loan issued and patronage refunds 
distributed. Paying out too much patronage refunds can decrease itE  severely, and issuing too 
much new loans can increase itL   dramatically. Both can hurt the capital ratio. 
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Table 5.1 summarizes the variables and the parameters used in the STELLA simulation 
model. Assets (outstanding loans) and equity are defined as the stock variables. New loans, net 
charge-offs, paid-off loans, patronage refunds, net income after tax are defined as the flow 
variables that change the stock variables. Interest rates, loan default rate, loan repayment rate, tax 
rate, and regulatory capital ratio are defined as the variant parameters.  
5.3.2 Model Road Map and Basic Equations 
 
I use STELLA to program the capital structure model. STELLA is an icon-based 
computer package with graphical interface to construct dynamic models intuitively and visually. 
The essential features of the System Dynamics are defined in terms of stocks, flows, converters 
and action connectors.  
STELLA map used to define the base simulation model is attached in Appendix C. Other 
changes, extensions and corrections are added to this base model in order to simulate different 
capital structure scenarios in later sections.   
For the assets value, outstanding loans tL , there is one inflow and two outflows. New 
loan tN  is added to the outstanding loans in each period. The charge-off ttt NL )(   shows the 
amount of loans defaulted. The default rate t takes any value between 0.43% and 2.14%. 0.43% 
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is the non-performing loans ratio in 2007, the lowest in the past five years. 2.14% is the non-
performing loans ratio in 2009, the highest in the past five years (Table 2.1 in Chapter2).   
The paid off ttt NL )(   shows the repaid loans and it depends on the average length 
t
1
of the loans portfolio. I assume the average maturity length of loans is 20 years, so 05.0t . 
In the simulation t is assumed to follow a uniform distribution U(0.04,0.06) in order to capture 
the possible early payment or past due payment. For example, 04.0t means 25 years loans 
maturity and 06.0t  means approximately 17 years loans maturity. 
For the equity value tE , the inflow is income after tax, tt  )1(  .The outflow is the 
patronage refunds, tP . The tax rate t  can take any value between 1% and 8%, which replicates 
the distribution of tax rate from my data set. The income before tax equals the net interest income 
minus the charge-offs and net non-interest income is assumed to be zero. The interest margin 
equals the interest income generated from the total loans minus the interest paid on the debt.  
In order to capture the uncertainty of interest rates, two interest rates t  and t
r
 
both are 
assumed to follow a three-state Markov process. The three states are high interest rate, medium 
interest rate, and low interest rate. At each current state, there are three possible directions for the 
next state. The transition matrices in a finite space are given in Table 5.2. The values are picked 
according to the empirical values of the two interest rates. 
The debt variable is used as the completeness condition to make sure that asset, liability 
and equity are balanced. Cap ratio is defined as the ratio of equity over outstanding loans. The 
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regulatory capital ratio   is set at 7%. If the cap ratio falls below 7% then both tN  
and tP  are 
forced to zeros. The association is prohibited from issuing new loans and distributing patronage 
refunds before it restores the cap ratio above 7%. The initial capital ratio is set at 18%, which is 
the average capital ratio of the FCS associations in my data set. 
 In the base model map in Appendix C, there are two variables with the questions marks: 
NT and PT. They represent the two unknown decision variables: new loans issued (NT) and 
patronage refunds returned (PT) if capital ratio is above the regulatory minimum. How these two 
decisions are made depends on the capital management goal, the capital structure and the variant 
parameters. This is the main focus of my simulation analysis, although the third decision 
variable: the interest rate charged on loans t  will be added into the analysis later on.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Section 4 will present the simulation results in details.  
The scenarios are listed in Table 5.3. I chose these the scenarios based on a desire to learn 
about the effect of key decision variables and parameters in the system on the capital structure of 
the modeled association. I consider scenarios on five variables and parameters: patronage 
refunds, new loan growth, interest rate charged, target capital ratio, and risk shocks.  
The simulations are carried out in the following order. First, two extreme cases are 
presented: the association returns 0% and 100% of its earnings as patronage refunds. This 
scenario will be discussed in section 5.4.1.  Second, a target capital ratio is pursued in section 
5.4.2. With a stochastic interest rate, patronage refunds behavior with steady loans growth is 
simulated. Finally, interest rate charged on loans is added as the third decision variable, and this 
scenario is discussed in section 5.4.3. The interdependence between the three decision variables: 
patronage refunds, new loans, and interest rate charged are investigated. The emphasis is on the 
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changes of new loan and interest rate charged given a stable patronage refunds practice and a 
target capital ratio. Particularly a normal capitalized association, an association with low cap 
ratio, and an association with high cap ratio are compared. A credit risk shock and an interest 
rate risk shock are incorporated into the simulation model to examine the effect uncertainty has 
on the system capital structure. 
5.4 Capital Structure Simulation Results 
5.4.1 Extreme Patronage Refunds Cases 
The capital management decisions depend on the management goal. If the association 
aims on maximizing the patronage refunds to its members, then all the after tax earnings will be 
distributed back to members. On the contrary, if the association wants to seize all profitable 
lending opportunities, then the patronage refunds will be completely held back. These two 
extreme cases are presented first. 
The STELLA maps for the aggressive patronage refunds and the zero patronage refunds 
are attached as Appendix D and Appendix E. The aggressive patronage refunds strategy assumes 
that the new loan grows constantly at 10% of outstanding loans, and 100% of the earnings after 
tax are returned as patronage refunds. In other words, the retained earnings are zero. In contrast, 
the zero patronage refunds strategy assumes that all earnings are invested on lending. The 
association is constrained with debt borrowing thus can only finance new lending by the retained 
earnings.  Figure 5.2 compares the balance sheet variables between the two cases over 20 
decision periods. In general, whether „decision period‟ equals a year, a month or a day, depends 
on how frequently the financial decisions are made. To keep consistent with the parameters 
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defined in the simulation model and the FCS data set, time period is considered as year here. It 
can be applied to other time horizons if the capital management decision is changed more 
frequently than annually. Only parameters need to be scaled accordingly.   
The top chart refers to the 100% patronage refunds case. Since the association returns all 
net earnings back to the members, its lending will be financed by debt only. Therefore equity 
(top yellow line #4) remains constant at the initial level. Debt (top pink line #2) actually 
increases at about the same rate as outstanding loans (top blue line #1). Patronage refunds (top 
green line #3) equals net income after tax.  
The bottom chart in Figure 5.2 refers to the 0% patronage refunds case. New loan 
(bottom green line #3) is financed by retained earnings and debt (bottom pink line #2) keeps 
constant. Equity (bottom yellow line #4) has no outflow and is accumulated up quickly. 
Outstanding loans (bottom blue line #1) increase at about the same rate as equity.  
Figure 5.3 compares the rates changes in the two cases. The top chart clearly shows the 
rapid dropping capital ratio (top blue line #1). It decreases from the initial 18% to around 10% 
after 20 periods. The 100% patronage refunds strategy exhausts the association‟s capital reserve 
and pushes the association towards the regulatory capital minimum level. If an association adopts 
this kind of strategy, its risk of falling below the regulatory capital ratio and facing receivership 
is large. On the other hand, the bottom chart displays a sharp rising capital ratio. The association 
easily builds up the equity level by retaining all earnings so the capital ratio grows sharply. 
Within 20 periods, the capital ratio is already raised to above 50%. 
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From the prospects of the regulator, FCA considers high capital ratio a good sign for safe 
financial operation. From the prospects of the FCS associations, they prefer to use retained 
earnings as a cheap internal financing channel compared to the external channel of debt 
financing. From the prospects of the farmer borrowers, they may lose one of the signature 
benefits as members of a cooperative, sharing the profit of their cooperative.  
It is not uncommon to observe zero patronage refunds in the actual FCS data but very 
rare to see a 100% patronage refunds policy. Nevertheless, the capital ratios of the zero 
patronage refunds associations are never higher than 0.5. In the later simulations, I will show that 
high capital ratio has potential problems too. With an aggressive patronage refunds, capital 
reserve is depleted soon and risk of falling below the regulatory capital ratio is also high. With 
no patronage refunds, capital reserve is accumulated very fast but it may cause excessive capital 
and high opportunity cost of lending.  
5.4.2 Target Capital Ratio: New Loans and Patronage Refunds 
For the remaining simulations, a target capital ratio is assumed.  In general, New Loans 
change (ΔNT) and Patronage Refund change (ΔPT) have inverse relationship if the association is 
constrained from additional debt financing. When an association pays out more patronage 
refunds, it slows the building up of equity capital. If the association cannot freely borrow new 
debt, the lending capacity is decreased. On the other hand, if an association accelerates lending, 
it normally needs to retain more earnings thus reduces the patronage refunds.  
Given a Target Capital Ratio (TCR), the relationship between new loans (NT) and 
patronage refund (PT) is derived in equation 5. The proof is provided in Appendix F.  
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      (5.5) 
where α is TCR and all other parameters follow same definition as Table 5.1. 
 
STELLA map used for the simulations with TCR is attached as Appendix G. Compared 
to the base model map in Appendix C, the capital management goal, i.e., keeping a stable TCR is 
added. NT and PT become dependent on each other. For instance, if NT is set as 10% of the 
outstanding loans in each period, then PT is decided by Equation (5.5).  
First, I choose three identical associations except that they have different initial capital 
ratios: Association1=10%, Association2=20%, and Association3=30%. Correspondingly their 
TCRs are 10%, 20%, and 30% as well.  That is to say they just need to maintain the current 
capital structure. To put these scenarios in context 18% is the average capital ratio among FCS 
associations in my data set, and the permanent capital ratio ranged from 9.1% to 27.6% for FCS 
associations in 2009. So correspondingly 10%, 20% and 30% represent the minimum, the mean 
and the maximum of capital ratios in my data set. Figure 5.4 lists a frequency histogram of the 
EA ratio in my data set. 
The evolvements of PT are recorded in Figure 5.5, as well as other balance sheet 
variables: outstanding loans, equity, debt, new loan, and capital ratio. From Figure 5.5, we can 
tell that the three associations always keep their initial capital ratios over time. The equity levels 
and the debt levels are consistent with the capital ratios. This means association with the highest 
capital ratio always has the lowest debt level and vice versa. Their outstanding loans grow 
closely, as well as their new loans.  
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However, the PT‟s change does not have a monotonic trend and the three associations do 
not show different patterns on the PT‟s evolvement over time. It suggests the different TCRs do 
not necessarily cause different patronage refunds behavior, as long as the associations just need 
to keep the current capital structure and have same new loans growth strategy.  
Next, I still take three associations with different initial capital ratios: Association 
1=10%, Association 2=20%, and Association 3=30%. And TCR is chosen as 20%. Now 
Association 1 has to increase its capital ratio while Association 3 needs to reduce its capital ratio 
if their capital management goals are to purse the TCR. Association 2 does not have to adjust its 
capital structure. Since PT is the focus, I only show the patronage refunds and the capital ratios. 
Firstly Association 2 and Association 3 are compared in Figure 5.6. Blue line is 
Association 3 and red line is Association 2. Association 3‟s initial capital ratio is as much as 
twice higher than its TCR. So Association 3 needs to lower its capital reserve in order to get 
converged to TCR. It turns out the capital structure adjustment takes much longer time than 
simply capital structure maintenance.  
As the association with the highest capital ratio among all FCS associations, it takes 
Association 3 at least 40 to 60 periods to get closer to the mean capital ratio: TCR. Naturally 
other associations will take less time to converge since the distance between their initial capital 
ratio and TCR is smaller. From the patronage refunds chart, Association 3 seems paying more 
patronage refunds than Association 2 for most of the beginning time periods. This pattern does 
not always hold, especially when Association 3 gets closer to the TCR.  
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Secondly, association 1 and association 2 are compared in Figure 5.7. Blue line is 
Association 1 and red line is Association 2. Association 1‟s initial cap ratio is much lower than 
its TCR therefore it needs to build up the capital reserve and eventually converges to the TCR 
level. Since Association 1 is about the same distance deviated from the mean capital ratio, it 
takes same time to converge as Association 3. Association 1 seems pay less patronage refunds 
than Association 2 this time. Again the pattern is more obvious in the beginning periods. 
These two simulations support the empirical observation in the Chapter Four: If EA ratio 
increases 0.01 then cash patronage refunds decreases 160 thousand dollars. An association who 
needs to boost its EA ratio lowers the patronage refunds and an association who needs to reduce 
the capital reserve distributes more patronage refunds.  
In summary, the simulations in this section illustrate how: 1. when a target capital ratio is 
selected as the capital management goal, associations could use patronage refunds as the 
management tool to maintain or adjust capital structures in order to keep up with a steady new 
loan growth. 2. Different initial capital structure does not affect the decision of patronage refunds 
as long as an association is near the target capital ratio and just needs to maintain the capital 
structure. 3. Capital structure adjustment takes more effort and time than capital structure 
maintenance.  4. Capital ratio adjustment does affect the decision of patronage refunds. 
Association who improves the cap ratio distributes less patronage refunds while association who 
reduces the cap ratio distributes more. 
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5.4.3 Target Capital Ratio:  New Loans, Patronage Refunds, and Interest Rate 
So far I assumed that the interest rate charged on loans t follows a Markov process in 
order to capture the uncertainty of interest rate. However, interest rate charged on loans t  can 
be used as a capital managerial tool, just as new loans issued and patronage refunds returned. 
As has been noted, associations sometimes use a lower t as a way of sharing profit with their 
members instead of distributing more patronage refunds. Therefore I extend the simulation of 
capital structure from two dimensions into three dimensions in this section.  
The simulations in this section are based on the previous ones and focus on the 
interdependence among three ratios: outstanding loans growing rate (NT_rate), patronage 
refunds pay-out ratio (PT_ratio), and the interest rate charged on outstanding loans. NT_rate 
equals new loans divided by outstanding loans. PT_ratio equals patronage refunds divided by 
equity. As long as a target capital ratio (TCR) is selected, the relationship between NT_rate, 
PT_ratio, and interest rate is decided by Equation (5.5). Given any two of the decision 
variables, the third is determined. The following two equations are derived. 
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Despite the theoretical flexibility of PT_ratio or patronage refunds amount, FCS 
associations are reluctant to frequently change their patronage refunds in the real practice. I 
showed the strong persistence in distributing patronage refunds in the Chapter Four. The Tobit 
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regression showed that: if an association‟s patronage refund is one dollar higher than the other 
in last period, this association is going to pay 56 cents more than the other in current period. 
Therefore in this section, I pay close attention to the flexibility of NT_rate and RHO 
(previously denoted as t ) rather than PT_ratio. Two scenarios are mainly discussed: 1. Given 
PT_ratio and NT_rate, how is RHO determined? 2. Given PT_ratio and RHO, how is NT_rate 
determined?  
The distinction between initial capital structures and TCR is again addressed in this part. 
In other words, I want to find out whether an association with high capital ratio and an 
association with low capital ratio make different decisions on NT_rate and RHO given all other 
conditions the same.  
Furthermore, risk shocks are added. In the Chapter Three and the Chapter Four, the 
significant relationship between patronage refunds and risk factors such as credit risk or interest 
margin has been identified. At this time, I incorporate a credit risk‟s shock and an interest 
margin‟s shock into the capital structure simulation. Associations still manage to keep their 
TCRs over time. Under such assumption, the simulation is going to show how they react by 
changing NT_rate and RHO to the capital shocks caused by sudden credit risk increase or 
sudden interest risk increase.  
5.4.3.1 Scenario 1: NT_rate’s Changes Given PT_ratio and RHO 
STELLA map designed for the three dimensional simulation with given PT_ratio, RHO 
and TCR is attached as Appendix H. Interest rate paid to FCS banks tr  
still follows a Markov 
process but interest rate charged on loans RHO is defined by a stock variable rho_pool and a 
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flow variable delta_ rho.  RHO changes from 5% to 7% gradually over the 20 simulation 
periods. PT_ratio changes from 1% to 10% gradually over the 20 periods. Therefore RHO is 
determined by Equation (5.6). 
Risk shock is defined by a PULSE(1%, n, ∆t) function in a new converter variable 
shock. Credit risk shock is defined as additional 1% on the loan default rate t  at any time in 
the 20 periods. Interest rate risk shock is defined as additional 1% on the interest rate paid to 
FCS banks tr  at any time in the 20 periods. In order to make the comparisons among 
associations with different capital structures brief and consistent, I assume the shocks only 
occur once throughout all periods, and it occurs in the middle. 
Figure 5.8 plots a surface chart of NT_rate after fixing PT_ratio and RHO as the floor 
dimensions for a normal capitalized association. This association has initial capital ratio 20% 
and TCR at 20% as well. At this time, neither risk shock is added. Overall new loan grows 
faster when RHO is higher, or when PT_ratio is lower. Especially, the new loan can grow as 
fast as more than 30% of the outstanding loans when the patronage refunds pay-out ratio is as 
low as 1% and the interest rate charged on loans is as high as 7%. On the contrary, the 
outstanding loans almost stop growing when about 10% of the equity is distributed as patronage 
refunds and meanwhile interest rate charged on loans reaches the low end, 5%. 
Two more associations are introduced. One association has initial capital ratio at 10% 
and TCR at 20%. The other has initial capital ratio at 30% and TCR at 20%. Figure 5.9 
compares the reactions on new loan growth to a credit risk shock from high-, normal-, and low-
capitalized associations. Figure 5.10 instead compares their reactions to an interest rate risk 
shock. In general, associations react to the shocks by reducing new loans growth in order to 
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keep up with TCR. NT_rate surface has a clear dent when the shock occurs, especially for the 
low capital ratio association. For both type of shocks, the high capital ratio association 
apparently absorbs the shocks the best. Its new loan growth rate is weakened to the lightest 
level.  
An interesting observation is that the high capital buffer helps absorb the shocks but it 
does not necessarily leads to aggressive lending. In fact when the patronage refunds ratio is 
high, i.e., 8%-10% of equity, high capital ratio association has much slower new loan growth 
than the other two associations. The reason is that high capital ratio association pays out more 
patronage refunds because of its high equity level and the magnitude is significant when 
PT_ratio is high.  Therefore its new loan growth is actually slower than low capital ratio 
association.  
The low capital ratio association suffers more from interest rate risk shock than credit 
risk shock. 1% sudden increase in the interest rate paid reduces the new loan growth 
distinctively. In contrast, 1% sudden increase in the credit default rate does not cause same 
severe result for low capital ratio association. 
5.4.3.2 Scenario 2: RHO’s Changes Given PT_ratio and NT_rate 
STELLA map used to construct the simulation on the interest rate charged on loans is 
attached as Appendix I. PT_ratio and NT_rate‟s definitions are the same as in 4.3.1. Interest 
rate charged on loans is determined by the patronage refunds, new loans issued, target capital 
structure, and other parameters in Equation 5.7. In order to keep the TCR, for any given 
PT_ratio and NT_rate, the association needs to adjust RHO. NT_rate changes from 1% to 10% 
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gradually and PT_ratio changes from 1% to 15% evenly. These two rates are the floor 
dimensions. The surface of RHO is plotted as the vertical dimension. The associations have 
initial capital ratio at 15%, 20% and 25%, according to the assumption of low-, normal-, and 
high capitalized associations. The TCR is still 20%.  
Figure 5.11 compares the surface charts of RHO
 
for three associations without any 
shock. Overall the interest rate charged raises when new loan grows faster or when patronage 
refunds rate is higher. Higher RHO brings in more earnings when the association pays out more 
patronage refunds or issues more new loans thus lowers the capital ratio.   
However the association with 15% initial capital ratio seems have narrower range of 
RHO
 
than the other two. This does not imply that the 15% capital ratio‟s association has a more 
stable capital structure. It is simply caused by the definition of PT_ratio. PT_ratio is defined as 
the percentage of equity. Although all associations‟ PT_ratios increase from 1% to 15 %, the 
association with 15% capital ratio actually pays out less patronage because of the low level of 
equity. Therefore the association does not have to acquire higher RHO
 
to compensate the paid 
out patronage refunds. 
Figure 5.12 provides the comparison of the surface moves of RHO
 
when the credit risk 
shock is added. Figure 5.13 provides the comparison for the interest rate risk shock. The 
associations use higher RHO
 
as the reaction to the sudden risk shocks. Credit risk shock adds 
extra loan defaults and interest risk shock adds extra interest expense; both reduces the 
earnings. In current scenario, the association is obligated to return a certain percentage equity as 
patronage refunds. So, in order to keep the TCR, it has to increase the earnings before the 
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distribution, i.e., charge higher loan interest rate. Furthermore, the association tends to return to 
the normal RHO
 
level after the recovery from the shocks.  
The credit risk shock‟s impact on RHO is more obvious than the interest rate risk shock 
for all three associations. For both types of risk shocks, the low capital ratio association seems 
to have the least movement in RHO. Previously the high capital ratio association has the least 
movement in NR_rate when risk shocks are added. Therefore the RHO of high capital ratio 
association is more sensitive to risk shocks while the NT_rate of low capital ratio association is 
more sensitive to risk shocks. In this sense, it is not always good to build up the capital ratio. 
When capital ratio is high, the volatility of the interest rate charged on loans is also high when 
either a credit risk shock or an interest rate risk shock occurs. 
From the risk shock simulations on NT_rate changes and RHO changes, I make the 
following recommendations to FCS association: association with high initial capital ratio 
should adjust its new loan growth when encounters risk shocks. Association with low initial 
capital ratio should adjust its interest rate on loans when encounters risk shocks. Using different 
capital management strategy to cope with risk based on the capital structure can help reduce the 
variance of the new loans growth and the interest rate charged, as well as the patronage refunds 
distributed.  
5.5 Conclusion  
The empirical analysis conducted in the previous chapters estimates the average pattern 
between the patronage refunds and a group of independent variables among all associations, 
while the simulation analysis conducted in this chapter emphasizes the movement of one 
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representative association‟s capital structure including the patronage refunds and other 
interdependent components over time.  
With the assistance of System Dynamics modeling techniques, the capital structure of a 
representative FCS association is constructed. Two extreme patronage refunds policies are 
discussed. My simulation shows that the 100% earnings distributing policy can push the capital 
ratio below regulatory minimum and brings high solvency risk to associations. This is consistent 
with the fact that we rarely observe an association pursuing such an aggressive patronage refunds 
policy. On the other hand, the 0% earnings distributing policy does bring some benefits to the 
associations. They are still able to keep up with a reasonable loan growth rate, and minimize the 
borrowed debt from FCS banks. In fact, there are many FCS associations that do not have a 
patronage refunds program currently. In the USagbank, Agribank and FCB Texas districts, about 
30% of their associations don‟t distribute patronage refunds.   
However, with a 0% paying out policy, the capital ratio rises sharply and high capital 
ratio has potential problems too. For example, in the simulations of interest rates paid on loans 
(RHO) with risk shocks, the association with a high capital ratio shows a more volatile 
movement in the loan interest rate than the association with low capital ratio. Most FCS 
associations have capital ratios between 15% and 25% which may reflect a desire to mitigate the 
disadvantages of pursuing an all or nothing refund policy.  
I also illustrated the relationship between new loan and patronage refunds if a target 
capital ratio (TCR) is assumed as the management goal. This in two ways: capital structure 
maintenance and capital structure adjustment. Main findings are: the simulation shows how 
associations can adjust the level of patronage refunds to keep up with a target capital ratio and a 
steady lending growth. In this case the capital structure need not affect the patronage refunds 
144 
 
decision as long as associations don‟t have to adjust their capital structure. On the other hand, 
associations can pay less patronage refunds if it needs to improve the capital ratio and vice versa. 
This simulation outcome may explain the negative relationship between EA ratio and patronage 
refunds cash amount found in the Chapter Four‟s regression model.  
Additionally interest rate charged on loans is added into the model as another decision 
variable. In order to represent the persistence of patronage refunds observed in the data set, the 
patronage refunds is now assumed to follow a steady growth path, and credit risk and interest 
rate risk shocks are included. The results show that high capital ratio association can absorb risk 
shocks better than normal or low capital ratio association in the sense of smoother new loan 
growth. However high capital ratio associations do show a higher volatility in the interest rate 
charged on loans than normal or low capital ratio association 
In summary, the capital structure simulation outcomes back up FCS association‟s practice 
of building up capital reserves. It also warns of  potential high variance in interest rate charged 
on loans when associations have unexpected risk increase either in default or in interest expense. 
Therefore the „philosophy of higher is better‟ is not correct.  
On one hand, the dynamic simulation model is build with the knowledge gained from 
previous empirical regressions. For example, both the Logit and Tobit models from chapters 
Three and Four identified the significance of EA ratio in the decision of patronage refunds. 
Therefore the capital structure adjustment is particularly investigated in the simulation of the 
relationship between new loan growth and patronage refunds. The Tobit model from Chapter 
Four suggested that interest margin and credit risk affect the patronage refunds cash amount, 
therefore the simulation incorporates these two factors and evaluate how capital structure 
changes when these two factors have unexpected moves.  
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On the other hand, outcomes generated from the simulation can also be applied to better 
understand the empirical patterns observed in FCS data. For example, in the last simulation 
scenario, for any fixed level of new loan growth, the interest rate charged on loans is increasing 
as the patronage refunds pay-out ratio is increasing. This is consistent with one of the conclusion 
in the Chapter Four: when interest margin increases 1% the patronage refund will grow from 
4322.25 thousand dollars to 4779.38 thousand dollars.  
 Future research topics include involving FCS banks‟ lending practice into the simulation. 
FCS bank‟s operation affects the debt financing channel on FCS associations, which is assumed 
to be limited financing channel in this current paper. Another research direction could explore 
the empirical comparison between FCS lending associations and commercial banks.  
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Tables 
Table 5.1: List of Variables and Parameters 
tL  
Average loans portfolio, association‟s asset 
tB  
Total debt borrowed from FCS bank, association‟s liability 
tE  
Equity capital 
tN  
New loans issued 
tP  
Patronage refunds 
t  
Net income before tax 
t  Proportion of loans paid off 
t  Proportion of loans went default 
t  Interest rate charged on loans 
tr  Interest rate paid on debt 
t  Tax rate on the taxable income 
  Regulatory capital ratio (7%) 
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Table 5.2: Markov Process Transition Matrices for the Interest Rates 
Matrix P 
1tr =0.04 1tr =0.03 1tr =0.02 Matrix Q 1t =0.07 1t =0.06 1t =0.05 
tr =0.04 0.5 0.4 0.1 t =0.07 0.8 0.15 0.05 
tr =0.03 0.2 0.6 0.2 t =0.06 0.05 0.9 0.05 
tr =0.02 0.1 0.4 0.5 t =0.05 0.05 0.15 0.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
 
Table 5.3: A Summary of the Simulations of Difference Scenarios 
 
Patronage 
Refunds 
New Loans  
Growth 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Target 
 Capital Ratio 
Risk 
Shock 
5.4.1 
100% of 
earnings 
Steady growth Markov None  None 
Zero  
As retained earnings 
grows 
Markov None  None  
5.4.2 
Flexible  Steady growth Markov Initial capital ratio  None  
Flexible  Steady growth Markov 18% None  
5.4.3 
Steady 
growth   
Flexible  Steady growth 18% Credit risk 
Steady 
growth 
Flexible  Steady growth 18% 
Interest  
risk 
Steady 
growth 
Steady growth Flexible  18% Credit risk 
Steady 
growth 
Steady growth Flexible  18% 
Interest  
risk 
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Figures 
Figure 5.1: Permanent Capital Ratio of FCS Associations 
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Figure 5.2: Balance Sheet Variables in Two Extreme Patronage Refunds Cases 
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Figure 5.3: Rates in Two Extreme Patronage Refunds Cases 
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Figure 5.4: EA Ratio Frequency Histogram 
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Figure 5.5: Three Associations: Initial Capital Ratio = TCR 
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Figure 5.6: Capital Ratio and Patronage Refunds. Association 2 and 3, TCR = 20% 
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Figure 5.7: Capital Ratio and Patronage Refunds. Association 1 and 2, TCR = 20% 
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Figure 5.8: Surface Plot of NT_rate Given PT_ratio and RHO 
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Figure 5.9: NT_rate‟s Changes to Credit Risk Shock of Three Associations 
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Figure 5.10: NT_rate‟s Changes to Interest Rate Risk Shock of Three Associations 
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Figure 5.11: Surface Plot of RHO without Shocks 
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Figure 5.12: RHO‟s Changes to Credit Risk Shock of Three Associations 
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Figure 5.13: RHO‟s Changes to Interest Rate Risk Shock of Three Associations 
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Appendix A: Schedule RI-D Changes in Net Worth of AgGeorgia Farm Credit, ACA 
FCA Institution Number: 720336      Quarter Ending 
Dollar Amounts in Thousands       Dec 31, 2007 
 
* Must be fully explained in an addendum 
(a)  Item 1, Col. G, must equal Schedule RC, item 19, as reported for previous period. 
(b)  Item 6, Col. G, must equal Schedule RI, item 18, for the current period. 
(c)  item 6, Col. F, must equal Schedule RI, item 12, for the current period. 
(d)  Item 15, Col. G, must equal Schedule RC, item 19, for the current period. 
(e)  Item 15, Cols. A thru F,  MAY NOT EQUAL item 15, Col. G. 
 
 
 
164 
 
Appendix B: SAS Outputs from Collinearity Test and GENMOD-GEE Model 
The REG Procedure 
                                      Dependent Variable: cash 
 
                                         Analysis of Variance 
                                                Sum of           Mean 
            Source                   DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
            Model                     8    17134972561     2141871570      83.15    <.0001 
            Error                  1164    29982806342       25758425 
            Corrected Total        1172    47117778904 
 
                         Root MSE           5075.27582    R-Square     0.3637 
                         Dependent Mean     3385.97954    Adj R-Sq     0.3593 
                         Coeff Var           149.89092 
 
 
                                       Collinearity Diagnostics 
 
                        Condition  -------------------Proportion of Variation------------------- 
Number   Eigenvalue        Index    Intercept         size       profit           ea          URE 
     1      6.97521      1.00000   0.00007290   0.00011524      0.00189      0.00265   0.00072580 
     2      0.93793      2.72705   0.00000401   0.00001690      0.00272      0.00210   0.00000481 
     3      0.63478      3.31488  8.098005E-8   7.86059E-8      0.01310      0.00978   0.00002161 
     4      0.20541      5.82732   0.00081867      0.00104      0.08954      0.30922      0.01638 
     5      0.10921      7.99176   0.00034040   0.00093465      0.33967      0.50315   0.00060614 
     6      0.06255     10.56004   0.00068335      0.00802      0.36963      0.12454      0.07083 
     7      0.04290     12.75131      0.00895      0.03592      0.13656   0.00007418      0.33750 
     8      0.02974     15.31351      0.00865      0.01659      0.01392      0.04504      0.30849 
     9      0.00226     55.50934      0.98049      0.93736      0.03296      0.00344      0.26545                                      
 
                                   ---------Proportion of Variation--------- 
                           Number       credit       interest            tax 
                   1   0.00093633        0.00466        0.00116        0.00161 
                   2   0.00001931        0.00656     0.00000563        0.87031 
                   3   0.00010336        0.69461     0.00035387        0.03993 
                   4      0.04112        0.15810     0.00096397        0.02785 
                   5      0.02238        0.02081        0.12114     0.00013255 
                   6      0.07155        0.03259        0.40631        0.04100 
                   7      0.08784        0.06007        0.14454    1.636948E-7 
                   8      0.77275        0.02250        0.22619        0.00759 
                   9      0.00331     0.00009384        0.09933        0.01158 
                                         The GENMOD Procedure 
 
                                         Model Information 
                             Data Set                        WORK.TEST1 
                             Distribution                      Binomial 
                             Link Function                        Logit 
                             Dependent Variable               paid_cash 
                             Observations Used                     1172 
                             Probability Modeled    Pr( paid_cash = 1 ) 
                             Missing Values                          14 
 
                                     Class Level Information 
 
              Class       Levels    Values 
              UNINUM         300    409003 409004 409011 409021 409024 409026 409034 
                                    409042 409045 409048 409062 409109 409112 409116 
                                    409125 409130 409140 409143 410012 410029 410031 
                                    410041 410051 410052 410055 410113 410120 410121 
                                    410149 410254 411022 411032 411042 411056 411058 
                                    411062 ... 
              DIST             5    10 20 22 24 30 
 
                                          Response Profile 
 
                                    Ordered    Ordered 
                                      Level    Value        Count 
                                          1    1              759 
                                          2    0              413 
 
                                        Parameter Information 
 
                                  Parameter       Effect       DIST 
                                  Prm1            Intercept 
                                  Prm2            size 
                                  Prm3            profit 
                                  Prm4            lag_profit 
                                  Prm5            ea 
                                  Prm6            URE 
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                                  Prm7            credit 
                                  Prm8            interest 
                                  Prm9            tax 
                                  Prm10           DIST         10 
                                  Prm11           DIST         20 
                                  Prm12           DIST         22 
                                  Prm13           DIST         24 
                                  Prm14           DIST         30 
 
                              Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit 
 
                    Deviance                1159       1116.8423          0.9636 
                    Scaled Deviance         1159       1116.8423          0.9636 
                    Pearson Chi-Square      1159       1376.4101          1.1876 
                    Scaled Pearson X2       1159       1376.4101          1.1876 
                    Log Likelihood                     -558.4212  
Algorithm converged. 
 
                              Analysis Of Initial Parameter Estimates 
 
                                        Standard    Likelihood Ratio 95%       Chi- 
   Parameter          DF    Estimate       Error      Confidence Limits      Square    Pr > ChiSq 
 
   Intercept        1     -6.9377      1.4490     -9.8085     -4.1218      22.93        <.0001 
   size             1      0.4369      0.0830      0.2759      0.6018      27.68        <.0001 
   profit           1     20.4560     12.0596     -2.8558     44.4950       2.88        0.0898 
   lag_profit       1    -11.9994      9.7377    -31.4451      6.7975       1.52        0.2179 
   ea               1      8.1238      2.1363      3.9454     12.3501      14.46        0.0001 
   URE              1     -1.5726      0.5467     -2.6937     -0.5412       8.28        0.0040 
   credit           1    -16.6302      8.3121    -33.1716     -0.5859       4.00        0.0454 
   interest         1     50.2823     11.2929     28.3025     72.6278      19.83        <.0001 
   tax              1     -3.4974      0.8175     -5.1426     -1.9348      18.31        <.0001 
   DIST      10     1      0.8925      0.2094      0.4845      1.3060      18.17        <.0001 
   DIST      20     1      4.9985      0.7585      3.7353      6.8571      43.43        <.0001 
   DIST      22     1      0.1147      0.2306     -0.3384      0.5665       0.25        0.6189 
   DIST      24     1      0.8493      0.2056      0.4490      1.2560      17.06        <.0001 
   DIST      30     0      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000        .           . 
   Scale            0      1.0000      0.0000      1.0000      1.0000 
 
NOTE: The scale parameter was held fixed. 
 
                                        GEE Model Information 
 
                         Correlation Structure                         AR(1) 
                         Subject Effect                  UNINUM (313 levels) 
                         Number of Clusters                              313 
                         Clusters With Missing Values                     14 
                         Correlation Matrix Dimension                     10 
                         Maximum Cluster Size                             10 
                         Minimum Cluster Size                              0 
 
                                  Covariance Matrix (Model-Based) 
 
              Prm1         Prm2         Prm3         Prm4         Prm5         Prm6         Prm7 
Prm1       3.15333     -0.17495      2.80733     -0.80750     -2.84880     -0.27076      0.03247 
Prm2      -0.17495      0.01127     -0.16741      0.01936      0.14845    0.0000959     -0.07025 
Prm3       2.80733     -0.16741       118.15    -42.97872      0.30147     -0.73904     19.57046 
Prm4      -0.80750      0.01936    -42.97872     74.76588     -1.07930      0.17290      0.08433 
Prm5      -2.84880      0.14845      0.30147     -1.07930      6.66286     -0.22666     -0.76112 
Prm6      -0.27076    0.0000959     -0.73904      0.17290     -0.22666      0.30580      0.43664 
Prm7       0.03247     -0.07025     19.57046      0.08433     -0.76112      0.43664     67.71892 
Prm8      -5.84094      0.28563    -53.85501      4.14400     -1.92946      0.86240    -12.11426 
Prm9      -0.21287      0.01253      0.13753      0.26783      0.01466      0.02297      0.01205 
Prm10     -0.12560     0.004518      0.07818     -0.03495      0.15302      0.02152     -0.04918 
Prm11     -0.21835     0.006182     -0.40113     -0.19437      0.12102      0.09272     -0.98055 
Prm12      0.15095     -0.01151      0.07314     -0.15049     -0.07884    -0.006652      0.08004 
Prm13      0.02658    -0.003280     -0.01788     -0.02713     -0.09935     0.006001    -0.001998 
 
                                   Covariance Matrix (Model-Based) 
 
              Prm8           Prm9          Prm10          Prm11          Prm12          Prm13 
Prm1      -5.84094       -0.21287       -0.12560       -0.21835        0.15095        0.02658 
Prm2       0.28563        0.01253       0.004518       0.006182       -0.01151      -0.003280 
Prm3     -53.85501        0.13753        0.07818       -0.40113        0.07314       -0.01788 
Prm4       4.14400        0.26783       -0.03495       -0.19437       -0.15049       -0.02713 
Prm5      -1.92946        0.01466        0.15302        0.12102       -0.07884       -0.09935 
Prm6       0.86240        0.02297        0.02152        0.09272      -0.006652       0.006001 
Prm7     -12.11426        0.01205       -0.04918       -0.98055        0.08004      -0.001998 
Prm8        103.83       -0.94665       -0.20237        0.96207       -0.25152        0.16889 
Prm9      -0.94665        0.56189        0.03853      0.0008031       0.003142        0.03263 
Prm10     -0.20237        0.03853        0.07196        0.03226        0.01819        0.02047 
Prm11      0.96207      0.0008031        0.03226        1.07148        0.01453        0.02141 
Prm12     -0.25152       0.003142        0.01819        0.01453        0.10345        0.02504 
Prm13      0.16889        0.03263        0.02047        0.02141        0.02504        0.07661 
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Covariance Matrix (Empirical) 
 
              Prm1         Prm2         Prm3         Prm4         Prm5         Prm6         Prm7 
Prm1       4.08091     -0.24031      2.10203     -0.98767     -3.25099     -0.34750      0.32161 
Prm2      -0.24031      0.01601     -0.18596      0.05711      0.17909     0.003098     -0.11629 
Prm3       2.10203     -0.18596     94.36575    -29.43554     -0.81275      0.50543     10.73830 
Prm4      -0.98767      0.05711    -29.43554     64.45085      2.28017     -0.52687     -0.44572 
Prm5      -3.25099      0.17909     -0.81275      2.28017      6.05707     -0.13897      0.71013 
Prm6      -0.34750     0.003098      0.50543     -0.52687     -0.13897      0.34537      0.24870 
Prm7       0.32161     -0.11629     10.73830     -0.44572      0.71013      0.24870       100.07 
Prm8      -3.63789      0.20689    -50.24952     -1.45558     -2.78649     -0.11494    -10.20776 
Prm9      -0.37607      0.02184      0.66856      0.26513      0.31139      0.04271     -0.44241 
Prm10     -0.10557     0.003863      0.16652     -0.11066      0.14917    0.0008857     -0.08389 
Prm11     -0.16550    -0.001215      1.51940     -0.53021     0.002788      0.13635      2.84272 
Prm12      0.24119     -0.01920      0.39060     -0.47276     -0.07110     -0.01109      0.57154 
Prm13      0.08841    -0.009245      0.08812     -0.24561     -0.12884      0.01224      0.09554 
 
                                    Covariance Matrix (Empirical) 
 
                  Prm8           Prm9          Prm10          Prm11          Prm12          Prm13 
    Prm1      -3.63789       -0.37607       -0.10557       -0.16550        0.24119        0.08841 
    Prm2       0.20689        0.02184       0.003863      -0.001215       -0.01920      -0.009245 
    Prm3     -50.24952        0.66856        0.16652        1.51940        0.39060        0.08812 
    Prm4      -1.45558        0.26513       -0.11066       -0.53021       -0.47276       -0.24561 
    Prm5      -2.78649        0.31139        0.14917       0.002788       -0.07110       -0.12884 
    Prm6      -0.11494        0.04271      0.0008857        0.13635       -0.01109        0.01224 
    Prm7     -10.20776       -0.44241       -0.08389        2.84272        0.57154        0.09554 
    Prm8        101.72       -2.82745       -0.13430       -0.65711       -0.38509        0.40043 
    Prm9      -2.82745        0.83451        0.05558       -0.01670       0.003190        0.03808 
    Prm10     -0.13430        0.05558        0.06641        0.02723        0.02724        0.02679 
    Prm11     -0.65711       -0.01670        0.02723        0.59617        0.02148        0.02815 
    Prm12     -0.38509       0.003190        0.02724        0.02148        0.22640        0.03940 
    Prm13      0.40043        0.03808        0.02679        0.02815        0.03940        0.10839 
 
Algorithm converged.                                    
 
                                    Working Correlation Matrix 
 
            Col1     Col2     Col3     Col4     Col5     Col6     Col7     Col8     Col9    Col10 
Row1    1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466   0.0216   0.0101   0.0047   0.0022   0.0010 
Row2    0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466   0.0216   0.0101   0.0047   0.0022 
Row3    0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466   0.0216   0.0101   0.0047 
Row4    0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466   0.0216   0.0101 
Row5    0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466   0.0216 
Row6    0.0216   0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003   0.0466 
Row7    0.0101   0.0216   0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159   0.1003 
Row8    0.0047   0.0101   0.0216   0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646   0.2159 
Row9    0.0022   0.0047   0.0101   0.0216   0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000   0.4646 
Row10   0.0010   0.0022   0.0047   0.0101   0.0216   0.0466   0.1003   0.2159   0.4646   1.0000                                  
 
Analysis Of GEE Parameter Estimates 
                                 Empirical Standard Error Estimates 
 
                                        Standard   95% Confidence 
                  Parameter    Estimate    Error       Limits            Z Pr > |Z| 
 
                  Intercept      -8.0114   2.0201 -11.9707  -4.0520   -3.97   <.0001 
                  size            0.4760   0.1265   0.2280   0.7240    3.76   0.0002 
                  profit         13.9848   9.7142  -5.0547  33.0243    1.44   0.1500 
                  lag_profit     -7.1188   8.0281 -22.8537   8.6160   -0.89   0.3752 
                  ea              6.5931   2.4611   1.7694  11.4168    2.68   0.0074 
                  URE            -0.7121   0.5877  -1.8640   0.4397   -1.21   0.2256 
                  credit        -16.4496  10.0036 -36.0562   3.1570   -1.64   0.1001 
                  interest       41.0551  10.0855  21.2878  60.8224    4.07   <.0001 
                  tax            -1.5576   0.9135  -3.3481   0.2328   -1.71   0.0882 
                  DIST       10   1.0799   0.2577   0.5748   1.5850    4.19   <.0001 
                  DIST       20   5.3616   0.7721   3.8483   6.8749    6.94   <.0001 
                  DIST       22   0.2051   0.4758  -0.7275   1.1377    0.43   0.6665 
                  DIST       24   1.1066   0.3292   0.4613   1.7519    3.36   0.0008
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Appendix C: FCS Association‟s Capital Structure Simulation: the Base Map 
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Appendix D: STELLA Map of Aggressive Patronage Refunds 
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Appendix E: STELLA Map of No Patronage Refunds 
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Appendix F: Proof of the Relationship Between NT and PT with a TCR  
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From (3), we can get  
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Substitute (1), (4), (5) into (2), we can get: 
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Appendix G: Map for Simulating Relationship between NT and PT under TCR 
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Appendix H: Map for Simulating NT_rate Given PT_ratio, RHO, and TCR 
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Appendix I: Map for Simulating RHO Given PT_ratio, NT_rate, and TCR 
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